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The Florida Probate Code
ROSEMARIE SANDERSON* AND ANDREA SIMONTON**
After tracing the gradual development of the Florida Probate
Code, the authors examine the recent case law under the code
and identify the statutory provisions in need of further
amendment.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1974, the Florida Legislature enacted a new probate code
(hereinafter referred to as "1974 FPC").' The former probate laws
* J.D. University of Miami School of Law, 1978.
** Former Research Editor, University of Miami Law Review; J.D. University of Miami
School of Law, 1978.
1. 1974 Fla. Laws, ch. 74-106.
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(hereinafter referred to as "1973 probate laws")' were extensively
changed by this enactment. These changes were examined in depth
in an article by Professors Fenn and Koren.3 That article also criti-
cized many of the provisions enacted in 1974 and made recommen-
dations for their amendment.' As a result, the 1975 Florida Legisla-
ture significantly revised the 1974 FPC.5
This article will analyze the extensive amendments enacted by
the 1975 legislature. It also includes an analysis of the additional
amendments enacted by the 1976 and 19777 Florida Legislatures,
and the cases construing the FPC. In certain situations, a compari-
son has been made between the FPC and the Uniform Probate Code
(hereinafter referred to as "UPC"). The FPC was modeled in part
after the UPC, and the comparisons illustrate the problems caused
by the piecemeal adoption process utilized by the Florida Legisla-
ture.
To facilitate the use of this article by the practitioner, it has
been arranged sequentially to correspond with the statutory scheme
of the FPC. Thus, it begins with a discussion of chapter 7311 and
concludes with chapter 73510 of the FPC.
II. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Chapter 731 of the FPC is entitled "General Provisions" and
contains provisions applicable to all probate proceedings." From the
time of their original enactment in 1974 to the present, these provi-
sions have been substantially amended by the legislature. This por-
tion of the survey will examine the new developments by discussing
each part of chapter 731 separately.
A. Title, Construction and General Provisions
Section 731.011 of the Florida Statutes is the effective date
provision of the FPC. Under the 1974 version, the FPC became
effective on July 1, 1975.12 Intense criticism of the statutory scheme
2. FLA. STAT. §§ 731.01-736.31 (1973).
3. Fenn & Koren, The 1974 Florida Probate Code-A Marriage of Convenience, 27 U.
FLA. L. REV. I (pt. 1), 615 (pt. II) (1975).
4. Id.
5. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220.
6. 1976 Fla. Laws, ch. 76-172.
7. 1977 Fla. Laws, chs. 77-87, -104, -172, -174.
8. The cases included within this article were decided during the period of time between
January 1, 1976, and December 1, 1977.
9. FLA. STAT. §§ 731.005-.303 (1977).
10. Id. §§ 735.101-.302.
11. Id. § 731.005-.303.
12. FLA. STAT. § 731.011 (Supp. 1974) (amended 1975).
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by commentators'3 prompted the legislature to substantially revise
the FPC prior to the July 1st effective date. The revised FPC be-
came effective on January 1, 1976 and is applied in determining all
substantive rights vesting after that date.'4
The statutory reliance on notions of vesting for operation of the
effective date provision has proven problematical. In Tenopir v.
Boles Estate, ' the decedent died in 1973, prior to the enactment of
the FPC. The plaintiff, an illegitimate child of the decedent, peti-
tioned for a determination of heirs in 1975. A summary judgment
was entered against the plaintiff in February 1976 based on the 1973
probate laws. The District Court of Appeal, First District, reversed,
holding that the 1976 FPC applied. The court reasoned that the
plaintiff's heirship rights could vest only when the trial court made
its determination of parentage and heirs in 1976. Consequently, the
vesting of substantive rights after the FPC's effective date man-
dated use of the 1976 FPC for determination of the plaintiff's legiti-
macy status. Under this decision, therefore, the rights of potential
heirs are contingent until a petition for determination of heirs is
adjudicated. This adjudication must be based on the 1976 FPC if
made after January 1, 1976. The date of the decedent's death is
irrelevant.
The comparable UPC provision likewise disregards the dece-
dent's date of death as controlling the applicable law; the UPC,
however, applies this rule without relying on notions of vesting. It
gives the trial judge some discretion in applying UPC provisions
where the result would be unjust or unfeasible.'" The result reached
in Tenopir appears inequitable as it allows the vicissitudes of court
calendars to determine the moment of vesting. A more appropriate
result would have been reached had the court held that all heirship
rights vest immediately upon the decedent's death." A subsequent
judicial determination of heirs or of one claimant's legal relationship
to the decedent would not change the moment of vesting, but would
13. See Fenn & Koren, supra note 3.
14. FLA. STAT. § 731.011 (1977).
15. 343 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977). The plaintiff, an illegitimate child of the dece-
dent, would not have qualified as a legitimated child under the 1973 probate laws, thereby
preventing him from taking an intestate share in the estate. See FLA. STAT. § 731.29 (1973)
(repealed 1974). Under both the 1974 and 1975 versions of the FPC, the plaintiff qualified as
legitimated child and could take as an heir. For a discussion of children born out of wedlock,
see text accompanying notes 60-67 infra.
16. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 8-101.
17. Strong support for this construction is the legislative enactment of FLA. STAT. §
732.101(2) (1977), which expressly states that the moment of vesting of heirship rights is the
moment of the decedent's death. For further discussion of this point, see text accompanying
note 53 infra.
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establish the identity of persons whose rights had previously vested.
Obviously, the particular problem encountered in Tenopir is much
less likely to recur. However, questions of "vesting" of other
"substantive" rights will inevitably arise in the future. To avoid
problems analogous to those in Tenopir, the legislature should con-
sider either redrafting section 731.011 to incorporate some of the
UPC provisions, or defining the terms used in the section.
B. Definitions
Section 731.201 of the Florida Statutes (1977) contains defini-
tions applicable to the entire FPC. In its 1975 revision, the legisla-
ture made several extremely important additions and changes. 8
Essential definitions of the terms "authenticated," "domicile" and
"residence" were added, 9 and the definition of the term
"beneficiary" was significantly restructured. The 1974 FPC broadly
defined the word as "heirs at law and devisees who have a present
interest in the estate of a decedent, trust, or other fiduciary relation-
ship." ° In what may have been merely an attempt to clarify this
definition, the 1975 legislature considerably narrowed it to provide
that "'[bleneficiary' means heir-at-law in an intestate estate; devi-
see in a testate estate; and the owner of a beneficial interest in a
trust."'" Under this definition, "beneficiaries" of a testate estate are
only those actually named in the will. Thus, the right of a decedent's
heirs at law to challenge a will in which they are not devisees will
be significantly affected by the definitional change.2" This situation
is discussed elsewhere in the survey.23
18. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, § 4 (amending FLA. STAT. § 731-201 (Supp. 1974)).
19. FLA. STAT. § 731.201 (1977) defines these terms as follows:
(1) "Authenticated," when referring to copies of documents or judicial pro-
ceedings required to be filed with the court under this code, shall mean a certified
copy or a copy authenticated according to s. 1733 or s. 1741, Title 28, U.S.C.
(11) "Domicile" shall be a person's usual place of dwelling and shall be
synonymous with "residence."
(29) "Residence" means a person's usual place of dwelling and shall be
synonymous with "domicile."
20. FLA. STAT. § 731.201(1) (Supp. 1974) (amended 1975).
21. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, § 4 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 731.201(2) (1977)).
The definition continues with the sentence: "The term does not apply to an heir-at-law, de-
visee or owner of a beneficial interest in a trust after his interest in the estate of trust has
been satisfied."
22. Operation of the new definition precludes such persons from challenging the validity
or construction of the will. If such person is a spouse or child of the decedent, he may qualify
under the pretermitted spouse or child provisions to recover part of the estate. See FLA. STAT.
88 732.301 & .302 (1977), and text accompanying notes 77-79 infra.
23. See text accompanying notes 185-90 infra.
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In conjunction with the change in the "beneficiary" definition,
definitions of the terms "heirs" and "heir-at-law" were added.,, The
legislature also added definitions of "child" and "parent. '25 These
new terms considerably clarify the application of provisions relating
to adopted persons, persons born out of wedlock, pretermitted chil-
dren, homestead, exempt property and the family allowance. 6
In 1975, a broad definition of "interested person" was substi-
tuted for the prior categorization of persons qualifying under this
term.Y An "interested person" is now defined, in part, as "any
person who may reasonably be expected to be affected by the out-
come of the particular proceeding. 28 This fluid standard is highly
desirable since many persons actually affected by probate proceed-
ings had been omitted from the former version's specific categories;
for example, the trustee of a trust subject to a devise. There is,
however, a narrowing aspect to this flexible standard. Under the
1974 FPC, a strong argument could be made that persons falling
within the specific categories listed were interested persons in all
proceedings, whether or not "reasonably expected to be affected by
the outcome." The last sentence of the definition, which seemed to
counter this argument, could be construed to apply solely to persons
who did not fall within a listed category. Thus, by deleting the
24. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, § 4 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 731.201 (1977)). The
definition provides: "(18) 'Heirs' or 'heirs-at-law' means those persons, including the surviv-
ing spouse, who are entitled under the statutes of intestate succession to property of a dece-
dent."
25. FLA. STAT. § 731.201 (1977) provides:
(3) "Child" includes a person entitled to take as a child under this code by
intestate succession from the parent whose relationship is involved, and excludes
any person who is only a stepchild, a foster child, a grandchild, or a more remote
descendant.
(24) "Parent" excludes any person who is only a stepparent, foster parent,
or grandparent.
26. Id. § 732.108 (adopted persons and persons born out of wedlock); Id. § 732.302
(pretermitted children); Id. § 732.401-.403 (homestead, exempt property and family allow-
ance).
27. FLA. STAT. § 731.201(17) (Supp. 1974) originally listed the following as interested
persons:
heirs, devisees, the spouse, creditors, beneficiaries, sureties on a personal repre-
sentative's bond, and any other person having a property right in, or claim
against, a trust estate or the estate of the decedent that may be affected by the
proceedings [and] . . . persons having priority for appointment as personal rep-
resentative and other fiduciaries representing interested persons.
28. FLA. STAT. § 731.201(21) (1977), which provides further that:
In any proceeding affecting the estate or the rights of a beneficiary in the estate,
the personal representative of the estate shall be deemed to be an interested
person. The term does not include an heir at law or a devisee who has received
his distribution. The meaning, as it relates to particular persons, may vary from
time to time and must be determined according to the particular purpose of, and
matter involved in, any proceedings.
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specific categories entirely, the 1975 legislature may have narrowed
the class of interested persons to only those expected to be affected
by the outcome of a particular proceeding. The effect of this new
definition on other sections of the FPC is the focus of discussion
elsewhere in this survey. 9
The definition of the term "claims" was amended by the 1975
legislature to exclude from its scope the liabilities of the estate
which arise at or after the decedent's death, as well as administra-
tion expenses and succession or death taxes."° These changes clarify
application of the provision requiring filing before the estate takes
a deduction for a claim, 3' and the provision pertaining to computa-
tion of a surviving spouse's elective share." Despite these beneficial
amendments, the legislature has yet to follow the commentators'
recommendation to expressly exclude funeral expenses from this
definition.33
C. Notice and Virtual Representation
Prior to the 1977 legislative session, there were two separate
statutes providing for waiver. One allowed waiver of rights by an
interested party,34 and the other allowed waiver of notice by any
person entitled to it." These have been consolidated into one provi-
sion, section 731.302 of the Florida Statutes, which is a comprehen-
sive attempt to cover the parties entitled to waiver as well as the
matters subject to waiver.
3
There are two potential problems with the new waiver provi-
sion. First, it does not specifically allow for waiver of the filing of
documents as did the prior statute. 3' Arguably, the filing of docu-
ments is a "right or notice" encompassed within the broad language
of the new provision. 3 It is also arguable, however, that the omission
29. See text accompanying notes 185-90 infra.
30. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, § 4 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 731.201(4) (1977)).
31. See FLA. STAT. § 733.702 (1977) and text accompanying note 264 infra.
32. See Id. § 732.207 and text accompanying notes 71-72 infra.
33. See Fenn & Koren, supra note 3, at 662.
34. FLA. STAT. § 731.108 (1975) (repealed 1977).
35. Id. § 731.302 (amended 1977).
36. FLA. STAT. § 731.302 (1977) provides:
Unless this code specifically provides otherwise, an interested person, including
a guardian ad litem, administrator ad litem, guardian of the property, personal
representative, trustee, or other fiduciary, or a sole holder of all coholders of a
power of revocation or a power of appointment, may waive any right or notice,
and consent to any action or proceeding which may be required or permitted by
this code.
37. FLA. STAT. § 731.302 (1975)(amended 1977).
38. See note 36 supra.
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evidences a legislative intent to revoke the right to waive filing. This
would be a regrettable loss, especially in the administration of small
family estates. The second potential problem is of greater signifi-
cance. The new provision does not require the waiver to be made in
writing as did the prior statute. 9 This omission can only result in
increased litigation over the establishment of alleged waivers. A
written waiver is not an unreasonable or burdensome requirement
when compared to the potential for abuse inherent in the new sec-
tion. Thus, although the scope of the consolidated provision is
highly desirable to facilitate administration and probate, the legis-
lature should consider imposing a writing requirement for its use.40
Section 731.110 of the Florida Statutes, pertaining to the filing
of caveats to prevent administration without the caveator's knowl-
edge, was considerably broadened by the 1977 legislature. Under the
1975 FPC, the procedure was limited to state agencies who were
creditors of the estate." It is now available to any person who is wary
of disposition of an estate without his knowledge."2 This change is
commendable. The legislature has transformed the caveat into an
efficient and simple protective device for a decedent's creditors and
others having a stake in the administration of the estate. The 1977
legislature also deleted from section 731.110, and transferred to the
Rules of Probate and Guardianship Procedure, the statutory re-
quirement of notice to the caveator before a will is probated or
before a personal representative is discharged. 3
Section 731.303 of the Florida Statutes, entitled "Representa-
tion," codified several exceptions to the doctrine that all persons
whose property rights are affected by a particular proceeding are
39. FLA. STAT. § 731.108 (1975)(repealed 1977).
40. Cf. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 1-402 (allowing waiver of notice by a writing signed by
the party or his attorney and filed in court).
41. FLA. STAT. § 731.110 (1975)(amended 1977). The operation of this section also ex-
tended to "any beneficiary who was apprehensive that a will might be admitted to probate
without its knowledge."
42. FLA. STAT. § 731.110 (1977) provides:
(1) If any creditor of the estate of a decedent is apprehensive that an estate,
either testate or intestate, will be administered without his knowledge, or if any
person other than a creditor is apprehensive that an estate may be administered,
or that a will may be admitted to probate, without his knowledge, he may file a
caveat with the court.
(2) No caveat shall be effective unless it contains a statement of the interest
of the caveator in the estate, the name and specific residence address of the
caveator, and, if the caveator, other than a state agency, is a nonresident of the
county, the additional name and specific residence address of some person resid-
ing in the county, designated as the agent of the caveator, upon whom service may
be made.
43. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-87, § 2. See FLA. PROB. & GUARD. R. 5.260(d)-(e) (1977).
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necessary parties to the proceeding." The 1974 version of this
provision mandated that an unborn person was bound by orders
affecting another party to the extent the unborn's interest was
represented by the other party having the same interest.45 This was
amended in 1975 to allow the ascertained party's interest to be of
the "same or greater quality" as the unborn person's interest.49
This change allays the commentators' fears that the provision was
unduly restrictive and would increase the cost of probate.
4
1
In conjunction with broadening the class of eligible representa-
tives of unborn persons, the 1977 legislature revoked the require-
ment that separate statutory notice for the unborn be given to such
representatives.48 Apparently, the legislature believed that the re-
quirement was redundant by demanding two notices to the same
party. Now, the required notice to the representative will presuma-
bly serve as constructive notice to the unborn person.
The 1977 legislature amended another subsection of section
731.303, which had previously provided: (2) Persons are bound by
orders binding others in the following cases: (a) Orders binding the
sole holder or all coholders of a power of revocation or a presently
exercisable power of appointment . . . bind other persons to the
extent that their interests . .. are subject to the power." In 1977,
the words "presently exercisable power" were replaced by the words
"general power."" At first glance, the amendment appears merely
to narrow the application of the section by removing the possibility
that orders on holders of special powers would bind subjects of the
power; the rewording, however, concomitantly broadens the com-
mon law doctrine codified in this section. At common law, subjects
44. FLA. STAT. § 731.303 (1977). It should be noted that although FLA. STAT. § 731.303
(1975) was entitled "Virtual Representation," its provisions actually encompassed more than
the narrow common law doctrine. That doctrine provides that unborn or unascertained per-
sons are bound by orders affecting those whose property interests are of equal or greater
quantity than those of the unborn. The other provisions in this statute defined the extent to
which subjects of a power are bound by orders affecting holders of the powers, and the binding
of wards, trust beneficiaries, and estate beneficiaries through orders affecting their fiduciar-
ies.
45. FLA. STAT. § 731.303(2)(c) (Supp. 1974)(amended 1975).
46. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, § 7 (amending FLA. STAT. § 731.303(2)(c) (Supp. 1974)).
The following example clarifies this doctrine. The holder of a tenancy for years or for life can
never represent a remainderman's interest because the tenant's interests are not of equal or
greater quality than those of the remainderman. On the other hand, a life tenant can repre-
sent the holder of a tenacy for years because the life tenant's interests are of greater quality
than the interests of the tenant for years.
47. Fenn & Koren, supra note 3, at 624.
48. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-87, § 5 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 731.303(4)(a) (1977)).
49. FLA. STAT. § 731.303(2)(a) (1975)(amended 1977).
50. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-87, § 5 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 731.303(2)(a) (1977)).
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of only presently exercisable general powers of appointment could
be bound by orders affecting holders of the power.5 The rationale
for this was that since the holder was also a potential subject of the
power, his interest in a proceeding was of the same quality as that
of the other subjects. The 1977 amendment expands the application
of the doctrine to subjects of general testamentary powers as well.
The holder of such a power does not appear to hold a quality of
interest equal to that held by the subjects, even though he may
appoint to his estate.52 If this expansion of the common law doctrine
was not the legislative intent, the section should be amended again
to read "presently exercisable general power."
III. INTESTATE SUCCESSION AND WILLS
Chapter 732 of the FPC pertains to the intestate distidibution
of property and the requirements for and operation of testate es-
tates. The following portion of the survey examines the statutory
changes made since the 1974 FPC and the case law arising under
this chapter since January of 1976.
A. Intestate Succession
Section 732.101 of the Florida Statutes defines an intestate
estate. In a 1975 amendment to this section, the legislature estab-
lished that an heir's right to intestate property vests at the moment
of the decedent's death.13 The holding in Tenopir v. Boles Estate5'
is clearly contrary to this rule. The Tenopir court held that the
rights of an alleged heir are contingent until a judicial determina-
tion of heirs is made, at which time the heirship rights vest in those
persons adjudicated "heirs" of the decedent.
Prior to 1977, section 732.106 of the Florida Statutes limited the
class of afterborn persons eligible to inherit from the decedent by
intestacy to afterborn "issue" of the decedent.5 This was recently
changed to afterborn "heirs,"" and now more nearly conforms to the
UPC provision.57 The effect of this amendment is to enable after-
51. See, e.g., Beardsley v. London & Lancashire Indem. Co., 124 Conn. 416, 200 A. 567
(1938); In re Scott's Estate, 353 Pa. 575, 46 A.2d 174 (1946).
52. See Phipps v. Palm Beach Trust Co., 196 So. 299 (Fla. 1940); In re Estate of Wylie,
342 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
53. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, § 8 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 732.101(2) (1977)).
There is no comparable provision in the UPC.
54. 342 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977). This case is discussed in greater detail in the
text accompanying note 15 supra.
55. FLA. STAT. § 732.106 (1975)(amended 1977).
56. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-87 § 6 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 732.106 (1977)).
57. Cf. UMFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-108 (using the term "relatives" rather than "heirs").
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born collateral relatives as well as lineal descendants to take
through intestacy. As noted by the commentators,58 proving the
eligibility of an afterborn is relatively simple with per stirpes distri-
bution and intestate shares limited to descendants of the decedent's
aunts and uncles. 5 The only necessary elements of proof are: (1)
that the alleged heir was born within nine months of his father's
death; and (2) that the father of the alleged heir predeceased the
decedent.
The section 732.108 provision for intestate inheritance rights of
persons born out of wedlock" is a fertile source of litigation in Flor-
ida. The 1974 version of this provision was substantially reworded
without substantive change by the 1975 legislature.' An important
amendment was made by the 1977 legislature when it added written
acknowledgment by the father as the third alternative method for
establishing paternity under the statute." This alternative was
embodied in prior Florida probate law, 3 but does not appear in the
UPC."4
Recent case law has recognized that an insurance application
signed by the decedent, in which he lists the child as his own, is
sufficient written acknowledgment to entitle the child to an intes-
tate share." Florida courts now permit a woman to testify that a
58. Fenn & Koren, supra note 3, at 44.
59. The FPC restricts intestate taking in both of these ways. See FLA. STAT. § 732.104,
.103(4)(b) (1977). Under the per stripes rule, the estate is equally divided among all relatives
holding an equally close degree of kinship to the decedent (not to exceed the degree of the
decedent's second cousins). Thus, a child of an heir can take only if his parent dies before
the decedent. In that case, he takes a share of his parent's share. If there are no living relatives
of a degree equal to that of his deceased parent, he takes equally with heirs sharing his degree
of kinship to the decedent.
60. FLA. STAT. § 732.108(2) (1977). Section 732.108 encompasses intestate succession
rights of adopted persons as well.
61. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, § 11 (amending FLA. STAT. § 732.108 (Supp. 1974)).
62. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-87, § 7 ch. 77-174, § 1. The pertinent section now provides:
(2) . . . . The person is also a lineal descendant of his father and is one of
the natural kindred of all members of the father's family, if:
(a) the natural parents participated in a marriage ceremony before or after
the birth of the person born out of wedlock, even though the attempted marriage
is void.
(b) The paternity of the father is established by an adjudication before or
after the death of the father.
(c) The paternity of the father is acknowledged in writing by the father.
FLA. STAT. § 732.108(2) (1977).
63. FLA. STAT. § 731.29 (1973)(repealed 1974).
64. Cf. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-109 (requiring the father to support the child and
treat him as his own before a paternity adjudication is effective to entitle the father to inherit
from the child).
65. Williams v. Estate of Long, 338 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976); In re Estate of
Jerrido, 339 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976). Both of these cases were decided under FLA. STAT.
§ 731.29 (1973), which allowed written acknowledgment analogous to the present provision.
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child born in wedlock was fathered by someone other than her hus-
band." Although her testimony alone is not sufficient to establish
paternity, it is highly relevant in a proceeding to adjudicate patern-
ity after the alleged father's death. It will therefore be important in
future inheritance proceedings under section 732.108. As previously
discussed, an adjudication of paternity incident to a determination
of heirs made after January 1, 1976 must be made pursuant to the
1976 FPC, even if the decedent died prior to that date. 7
Under section 732.109 of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1974), a
debt owed to the decedent was not charged to or included in the
calculation of the intestate share of any person except the debtor.
Under the same section, if the debtor predeceased the decedent, the
amount of the debt would not be taken into account in computing
the intestate share of the debtor's "issue."" The 1975 legislature
substituted the word "heirs" for "issue" in recognition of the inequi-
ties inherent in the original version." Consequently, the present rule
mandates that a debt owed a decedent be subtracted from the intes-
tate share of the debtor if he is alive at the decedent's death. If he
does not survive the decedent, the debt is not charged against the
intestate shares of the debtor's heirs, who would take per stirpes.
This is a preferable result when compared with the prior provision
under which heirs of the decedent other than his issue, for example,
his spouse, parents, etc., were chargeable with the debt.
B. Elective Share Rules
Chapter 732, part II of the Florida Statutes (1977) governs the
elective share of the decedent's surviving spouse. The elective share
concept was initially introduced in the 1974 FPC; however, the 1975
legislature made substantial changes in the organization as well as
in the content of this part. The following discussion will focus on the
substantive amendments and will not attempt to correlate the sec-
tions in which specific provisions now appear with the sections in
which they formerly appeared."
66. Gammon v. Cobb, 335 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1976). This case repudiated the strong com-
mon law rule that a child born in wedlock is legitimate and that his legitimacy could only be
attacked by the reputed father. See Barnett v. Barnett, 336 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
67. See Tenopir v. Boles Estate, 342 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977) and text accompany-
ing notes 15 & 54 supra.
68. FLA. STAT. § 732.109 (Supp. 1974)(amended 1975).
69. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, § 11.
70. As a brief overview, the following changes were made by the 1975 legislature: (1) FLA.
STAT. § 732.201 (Supp. 1974) was drastically amended and narrowly confined to the establish-
ment of the right to an elective share; (2) FLA. STAT. §§ 732.202-.204 (Supp. 1974) were
repealed, transformed and re-enacted as FLA. STAT. §§ 732.212-.214 (1975); and (3) FLA. STAT.
§§ 732.205-.214 (1975) were newly created. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, §§ 13-14.
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One of the most important amendments made by the 1975 leg-
islature was a change in the definition of the elective share amount.
Under the 1974 FPC, a spouse was entitled to one third of a "net
distributable estate," defined as all of the estate's assets minus
taxes, claims, family allowance, exempt property, and expenses of
administration.7' This was considerably modified by sections
732.206 and 732.207 of the Florida Statutes (1977). Under these two
sections, a spouse is entitled to thirty percent of the fair market
value of all the property of the decedent subject to administration
in Florida on the date of death, minus all valid claims against the
estate or payable from the estate. Although the percentage figure is
now smaller than in the 1974 FPC, there is a substantial increase
in the base amount under the amended version because of the re-
vised definition of "claims" in section 731.201(4).72 "Claims" explic-
itly does not include administration expenses, estate, inheritance,
succession or other death taxes. Each of these was expressly de-
ducted from the base amount under the 1974 version. Thus, the
legislature significantly increased the attractiveness of the statutory
share, especially coupled with the increased marital deduction
available under current federal tax laws.73 Note, however, that if the
election of the statutory share results in increased estate, inheri-
tance or death taxes, the spouse must bear the additional tax under
section 732.215 of the Florida Statutes (1977). Consequently, al-
though the spouse's share may be larger, he will be charged with any
additional estate taxes incurred if he upsets a carefully constructed
estate plan by electing the statutory share.
In 1975, the legislature added section 732.209 which defines the
assets from which the elective share is payable." The section gives
primary recognition to will provisions by providing that the spouse
shall receive the assets which would have passed to him under the
will, and that property assessed with the elective share may be
purchased by its original devisee. Thus, the provision goes far to
uphold the testator's testamentary scheme while enabling the sur-
viving spouse to take a share.
With the enactment of section 732.212, the legislature reduced
the spouse's time for election of the statutory share from five to four
71. FLA. STAT. § 732.201 (Supp. 1974)(amended 1975).
72. FLA. STAT. § 731.201(4) (1977); see text accompanying note 30 supra.
73. Under the Tax Reform Act of 1976, I.R.C. § 2056(c), the marital deduction was
increased to 50% of the adjusted gross estate or $250,000, whichever is greater. In all probabil-
ity, spouses choosing the elective share will fall withnin these ranges, and consequently,
qualify for the FLA. STAT. § 733.817 (1975) exemption from contribution to the estate tax for
property subject to the marital deduction.
74. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, § 15 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 732.209 (1977)).
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months after the first publication of notice of administration.75 If
litigation occurs, the time is extended until forty days after the
termination of litigation. Distribution of the elective share may be
required six months after the date of death or when the federal tax
return is filed, whichever occurs later.78
C. Pretermitted Spouse and Children
Sections 732.301 and 732.302 of the Florida Statutes (1977) de-
termine the rights of spouses and children not mentioned in the
decedent's will. For rights to accrue under these sections, the rele-
vant marriage, birth or adoption must have occurred after execution
of the will."
The 1977 legislature clarified and broadened the pretermitted
spouse provision. Section 732.301 of the Florida Statutes (1975) was
amended to include waiver by the spouse as an alternative to her
pretermitted share, and to allow the waiver or other spousal provi-
sion to be made in a prenuptial or postnuptial agreement.78 These
amendments recognize and permit more flexible estate planning
outside of the traditional will or marriage contract.7"
D. Exempt Property and Allowances
Chapter 732, part IV of the Florida Statutes (1977) sets forth
rules pertaining to certain of the decedent's property which may not
be subject to administration if he is survived by a spouse and/or
certain lineal descendants. These exceptions are applicable only to
property owned by a decedent domiciled in Florida.
Homestead property is governed by section 732.401,10 which
75. FLA. STAT. § 732.212 (1977) replaced FLA. STAT. § 732.202 (Supp. 1974). The latter
section was repealed in 1975. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, § 15.
76. FLA. STAT. § 732.214 (1977).
77. This requirement is explicitly set forth in two statutory provisions. See id. §§ 732.301
& .302.
78. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-87, § 9.
79. See McAbee v. Edwards, 340 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976), where the sole benefi-
ciary under a will sued the decedent's attorney for malpractice after he advised the decedent
that her subsequent marriage would have no effect on the will. The decedent's second hus-
band claimed as a pretermitted spouse and eventually settled with the beneficiary. The court
found the attorney liable, reasoning that when an attorney attempts to fulfill the testamen-.
tary desires of a client, he assumes a fiduciary relationship with the intended beneficiaries
as well.
80. FLA. STAT. § 732.401 (1977) provides:
(1) If not devised as permitted by law and the Florida Constitution, the
homestead shall descend in the same manner as other intestate property; but if
the decedent is survived by a spouse and lineal descendants, the surviving spouse
shall take a life estate in the homestead, with a vested remainder to the lineal
descendants in being at the time of the decedent's death.
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controls its descent by intestacy, and section 732.4015,1 which con-
trols its devise by will.
Section 732.401 provides that homestead property, if it is not
devised by will, passes to the surviving spouse as a life estate with
vested remainder in lineal descendants. This provision is the result
of a 1975 amendment giving preference to will devises, a priority
which the 1974 FPC had omitted."2 Section 732.401(2) specifically
exempts from its homestead provisions residences owned in the form
of a tenancy by the entirety, if there is a surviving spouse.
Section 732.4015 was added to part IV by the 1975 legislature .
3
It is a codification of article X, section 4 of the Constitution of
Florida, which prohibits the devise of a homestead if the decedent
is survived by a spouse or minor child, except that it may be devised
to the spouse if there are no minor children. The express exception
for devise to the spouse in the absence of minor children did not
appear in the constitution until 1972,4 although it was recognized
by case law prior to that date. 5
The two homestead statutes have been the subject of signifi-
cant litigation since 1976. In Estate of Murphy,"8 the Supreme Court
of Florida held that a homestead need not be passed by a specific
will devise, but rather could be passed by a general residuary clause.
The decedent had specifically devised his homestead to his wife for
life, remainder to his adult son, and the entire residuary estate to
his wife. The decedent later sold this particular homestead and
purchased another, but never changed his will. 7 Upon the testator's
death, his son challenged the wife's claim to fee simple title of the
new homestead under the residuary clause. The son contended that
homestead is not part of the probate estate, cannot pass through a
residuary clause, and must descend by intestacy."8 The supreme
(2) If the decedent was domiciled in Florida and resided on real property
that the decedent and the surviving spouse owned as tenants by the entirety, the
real property shall not be homestead property.
81. Id. § 732.4015 (1977) provides, "[als provided by the Florida Constitution, the
homestead shall not be subject to devise if the owner is survived by a spouse or minor child,
except that the homestead may be devised to the owner's spouse if there is no minor child."
82. FLA. STAT. § 732.401 (Supp. 1974)(amended 1975).
83. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, § 18 (derived from FLA. STAT. § 732.516 (Supp. 1974), as
transferred by 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, § 30).
84. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4 (1972).
85. In re Estate of McCartney, 299 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1974).
86. 340 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 1976).
87. Upon the sale of the original homestead, the specific bequest to the wife was void
under the common law doctrine of ademption by extinction. Because of this ademption, the
court does not discuss the retroactive effect of the constitutional amendment allowing a
devise to the spouse in the absence of minor children.
88. FLA. STAT. § 732.401 (1977), quoted in note 80 supra, now cdntrols when homestead
property is subject to descent by intestacy.
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court held that the residuary clause was effective to pass all after-
acquired property, including homestead. The court recognized that
neither the Constitution of Florida nor section 732.4015 of the Flor-
ida Statutes (1975) expressly limits the passing of homestead to a
specific devise, although this method is more desirable. This broad
and well reasoned construction acknowledges the desire of most
testators to pass homestead in fee simple to their spouses. More
importantly, it recognizes the tendency of homestead owners to
change residences more frequently than they change will provisions.
Although it was unnecessary for the court to do so in Murphy,89
the recent case of In re Estate of Endres0 construed the retroactive
effect of the constitutional amendment allowing a homestead to be
devised to a spouse in the absence of minor children. The decedent
had executed a will devising his homestead to his wife in fee simple,
but died prior to the 1972 amendment. He was survived by his wife
and two grandchildren, who would have taken a remainder interest
in the property if it descended by intestacy. The District Court of
Appeal, Fourth District, held that pursuant to the constitutional
provision and probate law in effect at the testator's death, the devise
to the spouse was invalid and the homestead was to pass as intestate
property." Thus, at the testator's death the grandchildren accrued
vested remainder interests in the homestead, subject to the spouse's
life estate. Anomalously, the court admitted that this result was
directly contrary to an earlier decision by the Supreme Court of
Florida, which upheld the devise of a residence to a spouse in the
absence of minor children prior to the amendment.2 Thus the
Endres court's decision not only failed to recognize the retroactive
effect of the constitutional amendment, but also failed to recognize
case law decided by the highest court in the state prior to its deci-
sion. This is clearly contrary to our common law form of jurisprud-
ence and should not be followed. The Supreme Court of Florida
ultimately reached the same conclusion by vacating the Fourth Dis-
trict's decision.
9 3
89. See note 87 supra.
90. 345 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
91. FLA. STAT. § 731.27 (1971)(repealed 1974), in effect at the testator's death, was
substantially similar to the present statute, FLA. STAT. § 732.401(1) (1977), as set forth in note
80 supra. The constitutional provision in effect at the testator's death provided: "The home-
stead shall not be subject to devise if the owner is survived by spouse or minor child ......
FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4 (1968).
92. In re Estate of McCartney, 299 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1974).
93. Endres v. Matthias, 353 So. 2d 843 (Fla.), vacating sub noma. In re Estate of
Endres, 345 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977); accord, In re Estate of McCartney, 299 So. 2d 5
(Fla. 1974).
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In re Estate of Wartels"' presented the question whether owner-
ship in a cooperative apartment qualifies as homestead -property
under the laws of descent and distribution. This was a case of first
impression for Florida courts. The Attorney General of Florida had
already decided the question in the negative." The basis for his
ruling was that ownership of a cooperative apartment is a stock
rather than a realty interest, and that the statute allowing such
owners a homestead tax exemption was confined to taxation pur-
poses only." The District Court of Appeal, Third District, recog-
nized the importance of this case and certified the question to the
Supreme Court of Florida. The supreme court agreed with the Third
District, holding that a cooperative apartment is not homestead
property for purposes of property descent."
Section 732.402 of the Florida Statutes lists the exempt prop-
erty, other than homestead, to which a surviving spouse or minor
children are entitled upon the death of a Florida domiciliary. In
1975, the legislature amended the provision to include automobiles,
as well as household furnishings, furniture and appliances, up to a
total value of five thousand dollars. 8 At the same time, the legisla-
ture deleted the provision that rights to this property had priority
over all unsecured claims. The 1977 legislature recently reinstated
the priority of rights in this property over all other estate claims
except perfected security interests on specific items of exempt prop-
erty." The amendment puts all exempt property beyond the reach
of unperfected creditors and assessment for funeral debts and ad-
ministration expenses, in conformity with section 2-402 of the UPC.
The final section of part IV is section 732.403 of the Florida
Statutes (1977), which provides for payment of a six thousand dollar
maximum family allowance to the surviving spouse and dependent
lineal heirs of the decedent. Application of this provision was origi-
nally limited to the surviving spouse and minor children whom the
decedent was supporting or had an obligation to support.'"' In 1975,
the legislature broadened the scope of section 732.403 by changing
94. 388 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976). The spouse was held entitled to dower (one third
of decedent's real property), but the decedent's interest in the cooperative apartment was not
included in this calculation.
95. [1971] FLA. Arr'y GEN. ANNUAL REP. 27,
96. See FLA. STAT. §§ 196.031 & .041 (1971)(amended 1972, 1973 & 1974).
97. In re Estate of Warteels, No. 50,488 (Fla. April 7, 1978). The court held that an owner
of a cooperative apartment does not have a proprietary interest in realty which is required
for the status of homestead property other than for purposes of taxation.
98. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, § 19.
99. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-87, § 10. FLA. STAT. § 732.402 (1975) was also technically
amended for clarification by 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-174, § 1.
100. FLA. STAT. § 732.403 (Supp. 1974)(amended 1975).
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the words "minor children" to "the decedent's lineal heirs"
throughout the provision, and specifically defining "lineal heirs" as
lineal ascendants and descendants.'' The amendment is important
and sound. It recognizes the probability that dependent ascendants
of the decedent, such as parents, will require living expenses during
the period of administration. Moreover, it acknowledges the modern
social trend of children remaining dependent on their parents after
reaching the age of majority.
E. Wills
Part V of the FPC governs the making and revocation of testa-
mentary instruments. Section 732.502 of the Florida Statutes (1977)
sets forth the requirements for a legally executed will. In its 1974
version, this provision contained a purging clause which operated to
invalidate gifts to attesting witnesses unless two other disinterested
witnesses signed the document.' In accordance with the UPC, this
clause was deleted in 1975 along with a reference to it in section
732.504.103 The 1975 legislature amended another portion of section
732.502 to provide that a handwritten will executed in accordance
with the FPC would not be considered a holographic will.' This
amendment closed a major gap in the statute which otherwise pro-
vides that a holographic will by a nonresident of Florida is invalid.0 5
Commentators on the 1974 FPC feared that the requirements
imposed by the self-proving will provision, section 732.503, would be
imputed as standards for determining the validity of all wills exe-
cuted under section 732.502.05 In re Estate of Kavcic'07 confronted
this construction of the statutes. The testator had signed a will
disposing of personal property in the presence of two attesting wit-
nesses who then signed it in the presence of each other, but not in
the presence of the testator. The self-proving will provision requir-
ing witnesses to sign in the testator's presence was in effect, along
101. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, § 19 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 732.403 (1977)).
102. FLA. STAT. § 732.502(3) (Supp. 1974) (repealed 1975).
103. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, §§ 21 & 22. Prior to the amendment, the courts regularly
avoided this rule. E.g., In re Estate of Johnson, 347 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977), where
the court upheld a bequest to the testator's maid who had witnessed the will with one other
person. The court found that there was no reason to apply the rule because there was no
possibility of undue influence by the maid.
104. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, § 21.
105. FLA. STAT. § 732.502(2) (1975) provides that "[alny will, other than a holographic
or nuncupative will, executed by a nonresident of Florida ... is valid as a will in this state if
valid under the laws of the state or country where the testator was at the time of execution..
106. Fenn & Koren, supra note 3, at 19.
107. 341 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
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with a pre-FPC statute imposing a similar requirement solely on
wills disposing of real property."8 The District Court of Appeal,
First District, held that the self-proof provision did not control in
determining the propriety of the will's execution. Rather, the self-
proof provision enabled the testator to choose one easy method for
authentication if he so desired. The decision is commendable and
appears to be consistent with the legislative intent to offer the
choice of a higher degree of formality in exchange for ease of authen-
tication. It must be noted, however, that the narrow issue in Kavcic
has become moot. The 1975 legislature amended section 732.502(1),
the general execution provision, to require the witnesses to sign in
each other's presence.' The formalities required by section 732.502
are now aligned closely with those required by the self-proof provi-
sion, section 732.503. Thus, the fears of the commentators were well
founded, although it was not anticipated that the legislature itself
would adopt the self-proving will requirements as standards of va-
lidity for all wills.
In 1975, the legislature amended section 732.505, which pro-
vides for revocation by writing, and section 732.504, which provides
for revocation by act, specifically to subject codicils as well as wills
to these provisions."' Since "will" is defined in section 732.201(34)
as including codicils, the amendments are technically unnecessary,
but they do provide clarification.
Section 732.507(2) provides that upon dissolution of marriage
all will bequests in favor of the divorced spouse are void."' Despite
this statute, the importance of revising a will after divorce cannot
be overemphasized. In Lamontagne v. Hunter, " the decedent's will
devised his entire estate to his wife, and if she should predecease
him, to his stepsons (the wife's children). The decedent divorced his
wife, but did not amend the will. Upon his death, the District Court
of Appeal, Second District, held that the estate should be divided
between the children. The court construed the will to mean that the
children were intended to take if the wife was unavailable to do so,
and that divorce had an effect analogous to death in removing the
spouse from the will. It is questionable whether this result manifests
the decedent's intent. Since the court could not create testamentary
dispositions from extrapolated intent, however, the decision reached
108. FLA. STAT. § 731.07(2) (1973) (repealed 1974). Thus, if the court found the self-
proving requirements necessary, the will lacked the necessary formalities to be effective for
probate.
109. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, § 21.
110. Id. § 23.
111. FLA. STAT. § 732.507(2) (1977).
112. 341 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
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here reasonably construes the will provisions in light of the testator's
inaction.
Section 732.508, entitled "Revival by Revocation," was
amended in 1975 to codify the common law doctrine that revocation
of a codicil does not revoke the will, but is presumed to reinstate
the provisions it originally changed or deleted."' This codification
is merely an extension of prior Florida case law."'
Another common law doctrine statutorily enacted by the 1975
legislature is the doctrine of independent significance, now embod-
ied in section 732.512(2). 11 Recognized under prior Florida case law,
this doctrine allows the testator some latitude in describing his
intended beneficiaries or the property they are to receive." 6 As long
as the determining events or contingencies have significance apart
from their impact on the will, the disposition is presumed not to
have been made in avoidance of formal will requirements. The codi-
fication of the doctrine of independent significance is commendable.
As noted in early criticism of the 1974 FPC,"7 the doctrine of inde-
pendent significance complements the doctrine of incorporation by
reference embodied in section 732.512(1) and acts as a restraint on
the operation of section 732.515, which is discussed below.
Section 732.515 of the Florida Statutes (1977) is unique to the
FPC. The provision expands the incorporation by reference doctrine
embodied in section 732.512(1) by suspending the prerequisites of
section 732.512(1) for disposition of special classes of property.
Under section 732.515, a will is effective to dispose of tangible per-
sonal property listed in a separate document executed by the testa-
tor either before or after the execution of the will. In the 1974 ver-
sion, money, evidences of indebtedness, documents of title, securi-
ties and property used in a trade or business were excluded from
such disposition." 8 The 1975 legislature broadened the provision
considerably by deleting evidences of indebtedness, documents of
title and securities from the exceptions." 9 This amendment has
transformed section 732.515 into a likely vehicle for abuse. The lack
of formal requirements in the provision as a whole and the possible
substantial monetary value of the items now permitted to be passed
113. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, § 25.
114. See In re Estate of Griffis, 330 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976)(applying the common
law rule).
115. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, § 27 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 732.511 (1977)).
116. See Howe v. Fry, 116 Fla. 528, 157 So. 331 (1934) (upholding a bequest to "servants
in my employ at the time of my death").
117. Fenn & Koren, supra note 3, at 21-22.
118. FLA. STAT. § 732.515 (Supp. 1974)(amended 1975).
119. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, § 29.
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under the provision are compelling reasons for enactment of more
stringent formal requirements within the provision, or reenactment
of the exceptions deleted in 1975.
F. Rules of Construction
Part VI of the FPC promulgates the rules applicable in constru-
ing wills. The 1975 legislature revised the organization of the first
three sections for clarification. 20 The 1975 legislature also adopted
the UPC provision that the expressed intentions of the testator pre-
vail.'' This addition will avoid problems of construction which may
arise when applying other UPC derived provisions without this un-
derlying assumption.'22 Case law under part VI provisions has been
a mechanical application of the rules.' 3
G. Contracts Relating to Death
There are only two sections in part VII of the FPC. Continued
from the prior probate laws,'24 section 732.701(1) of the Florida Stat-
utes is a "Statute of Frauds" for agreements relative to succession.
The 1974 version was amended in 1975 to encompass agreements not
to revoke a devise and agreements not to make a will or devise.
2 5
These additions are in concert with section 2-701 of the UPC and
are essential to avoid loopholes in the statute.'26 Under the predeces-
sor of section 732.701(1), Florida courts have recognized that anten-
uptial agreements are enforceable,' 27 that a promisor can be com-
pelled to perform his contract to make a will in another's favor, 2 '
and that a prior will does not qualify as an agreement to make a
devise, even though it is witnessed in accordance with the statute.'
29
120. Id. §§ 33 & 35.
121. Compare 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, § 35 (current version at FLA. STAT. §
732.6005(1) (1977)) with UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 2-603, -604.
122. Fenn & Koren, supra note 3, at 26.
123. E.g., In re Cole's Estate, 44 Fla. Supp. 153 (Palm Bch. Cir. Ct. 1976), in which the
court applied FLA. STAT. § 732.603(2) (1975)(antilapse); id. § 732.604 (failure of a specific
devise); and id. § 732.606 (nonademption by extinction of certain devises).
124. FLA. STAT. § 731.051 (1973)(repealed 1974).
125. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-200, § 39.
126. For example, prior to the 1975 additions, an heir with priority to take under the
intestate succession laws could legally enforce an oral agreement by the decedent not to make
a will or devise; meanwhile, another person was prohibited from enforcing an oral contract
by the decedent to make a will unless the contract complied with the statutory requirements.
127. In re Estate of Rothstein, 326 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
128. Id.
129. First Gulf Beach Bank & Trust Co. v. Grubaugh, 330 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
In Grubaugh the testator orally promised to give her nephew her estate if he cared for her,
and executed a will devising 80% of her estate to him. Later, she executed another will leaving
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Section 732.701(2) of the Florida Statutes (1977) pertains to the
execution of joint or mutual wills. A 1975 legislative amendment
clarified the section by expressly stating that the execution of such
wills does not raise presumptions of a contract to make a will or not
to revoke a will.
13°
The case of Cohen v. Cohen 31 is an example of the kinds of
problems created by joint wills. In this case, spouses executed joint
wills devising their property to each other for life, remainder to five
named beneficiaries to "share and share alike." After the wife's
death, one of the named beneficiaries died. The husband then exe-
cuted a codicil substituting another person for the deceased benefi-
ciary. As a consequence, the four original devisees brought an action
for breach of contract against the husband. The District Court of
Appeal, Second District, held that there was no breach because
after the execution of the codicil each devisee was entitled to the
same proportion of the estate as he would have received under the
original wills. 32 This reasoning is correct, as far as it goes; however,
if the husband had not executed the codicil (i.e., "had not
breached"), each beneficiary would have been entitled to one
quarter of the estate since the gift to the deceased devisee would
have lapsed completely. 3  Nevertheless, the decision is sound in
view of the expressed disavowal of presumptions of contract in sec-
tion 732.701(2).
The waiver of rights by a surviving spouse is governed by sec-
tion 732.702 of the Florida Statutes (1977). The 1974 FPC required
that spouses make a "full" disclosure of their estates to each other
before a waiver executed after marriage would be recognized.134 This
was changed in 1975 to require only "fair" disclosure,' 31 in conform-
ity with section 2-204 of the UPC. The 1977 legislature has broad-
ened the scope of this waiver provision by allowing a spouse to waive
his intestate succession and pretermitted spousal rights as well as
his elective share, homestead, family allowance and exempt prop-
erty rights. 3 ' The legislature also amended its definition of "all
him only 7% of her estate. The nephew unsuccessfully contended that the prior will was an
enforceable agreement because it was witnessed according to statutory requirements.
130. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, § 39. The former provision, FLA. STAT. § 732.701(2)
(Supp. 1974), provided that "[tihe execution of a joint will or mutual wills does not create
a presumption of a contract not to revoke the will or. wills."
131. 333 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
132. Id. at 117.
133. See FLA. STAT. § 732.603(2) (1977)(antilapse provision). The devisees in Cohen were
not related to the testators in any way.
134. FLA. STAT. § 732.702(2) (Supp. 1974)(amended 1975).
135. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, § 39.
136. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-87, § 14.
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rights" to include intestate succession and pretermitted spousal
rights when this term is used in a waiver agreement.137 Enlarging the
scope of spousal waiver is highly beneficial to long term estate plan-
ning because it frees the estate from unpredictable contingencies,
such as, whether the spouse will take the statutory elective share
rather than the will bequest.
H. More General Provisions
Part VIII of the FPC contains four general provisions not read-
ily classified under any other part.
Disclaimers of interests are governed by section 732.801, of the
Florida Statutes (1977) which was derived from previous probate
law. 31 The 1975 legislature added "present or future" interests to
the types of interests disclaimable.'35 Furthermore, the time for re-
cording the disclaimer was reduced from one year to nine months
and a provision allowing an additional six month extension was
deleted."10 These changes may have been prompted by the dis-
claimer provision in the then proposed Tax Reform Act of 1976.'
Under the federal statute, the effectiveness of a disclaimer under
state law is immaterial. A disclaimer is effective for federal tax
purposes only if it is received by the transferor's legal representative
within nine months after (a) the date of the transfer creating the
interest, or (b) the date the transferee reaches age twenty-one,
whichever is later. Thus, most disclaimers which are timely re-
corded under the FPC will meet the federal receipt requirement,
but due to a recent change in the FPC, however, some may not.
The 1977 legislature broadened the time for recording a disclaimer
to include any time after the creation of the interest if all inter-
ested parties give written consent."' Thus, disclaimers recorded
pursuant to this provision will be ineffective under the federal
statute unless the legal representative received the disclaimer
137. Id.
138. 1973 Fla. Laws, ch. 73-334, § 26 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 731.37 (1973)(repealed
1974)).
139. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, § 40. FLA. STAT. § 732.801(1)(d) (1977) provides:
(d) An "interest in property" that may be disclaimed shall include:
1. The whole of any property, real or personal, legal or equitable, present
or future interest, or any fractional part, share, or portion of property or specific
assets thereof.
2. Any estate in the property.
3. Any power to appoint, consume, apply, or expend property, or any other
right, power, privilege, or immunity relating to it.
140. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, § 40.
141. I.R.C. § 2518.
142. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-87, § 15.
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within nine months after the creation of the interest, and merely
delayed its recording.
Section 732.802 of the Florida Statutes (1977) prevents the con-
victed murderer of a decedent from receiving any part of the dece-
dent's estate by either intestate succession or devise. In the case In
re Estate of Nunnelley, "I the plaintiff was indicted for first degree
murder of the decedent but pleaded guilty to manslaughter. He then
attempted to gain sole ownership of real property held by himself
and the decedent in a tenancy by the entirety. Section 732.802 did
not apply to prevent such ownership because the plaintiff was not
convicted of the crime of murder. The District Court of Appeal,
Second District, resorted to the equity principle that a wrongdoer
cannot profit by his acts and held that the plaintiff's wrongful act
severed the original tenancy into a tenancy in common. Conse-
quently, the plaintiff was entitled to his half interest in the prop-
erty, the other half interest descending by intestacy to the dece-
dent's collateral heirs. This case plainly illustrates the injustice of
the murder "conviction" requirement in section 732.802. The legis-
lature should either broaden its definition of murder for purposes of
this statute or consider adopting the language of section 2-803 of the
UPC, which does not require a conviction.'
I. Production of Wills
Presently, chapter 732, part IX of the Florida Statutes (1977)
contains only one provision setting forth the mechanics for produc-
tion of a will. No change has been made in the section since its 1974
enactment.
J. Anatomical Gifts
Part X of the FPC pertains to anatomical gifts of parts of the
body after the death of the donor. Prior to 1975, the sections of the
present part X were contained in part IX. To clearly delineate the
different subject matter treated, the 1975 legislature placed the ana-
tomical gift sections under part X.1 The 1977 legislature added
section 732.9185 of the Florida Statutes (1977) to this part.'46 Effec-
tive July 1, 1977, the section sets forth the conditions under which
a medical examiner may remove a decedent's cornea upon request
of an eye bank. It also exempts the medical examiner from civil or
143. 343 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
144. Fenn & Koren, supra note 3, at 41.
145. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, § 45.
146. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-172, § 1.
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criminal liability for failure to obtain consent by the next of kin.'"7
The provision is an extremely useful guide for medical examiners
and is consistent with the other provisions in part X.
IV. ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES
Chapter 733 of the Florida Statutes (1977) delineates the proce-
dures to be followed during the administration of the probate estate.
It is arranged substantially in chronological order, beginning with
the admission of the will to probate and concluding with the final
distribution of assets and discharge of the personal representative.
There are nine parts in this chapter, each of which will be discussed
separately.
A. General Provisions
Chapter 733, part'I of the Florida Statutes (1977) contains those
statutes which generally describe the administration of estates, but
do not fit neatly within the chronological scheme of chapter 733.
Section 733.103'14 governs the effect of probate. It provides:
147. Id. This section provides:
Corneal removal by medical examiners.-
(1) In any case in which a patient is in need of corneal tissue for a trans-
plant, a district medical examiner or associate medical examiner may, upon
request of any eye bank authorized under s. 732.918, provide the cornea of a
decedent whenever all of the following conditions are met:
(a) A decedent who may provide a suitable cornea for the transplant is
under the jurisdiction of the medical examiner and an autopsy is required in
accordance with s. 406.11.
(b) No objection by the next of kin of the decedent is known by the medical
examiner.
(c) The removal of the cornea will not interfere with the subsequent course
of an investigation or autopsy.
(2) Neither the district or associate medical examiner nor any eye bank
authorized under s. 732.918 may be held liable in any civil or criminal action for
failure to obtain consent of the next of kin.
FLA. STAT. § 732.9185 (1977).
148. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-174, § 1 (amending FLA, STAT. § 733.103 (1975), codified at
FLA. STAT. § 733.103 (1977)).
In 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-87, § 17, the phrase "competency of the testator" in subsection
(2) was deleted. It was replaced by the more specific terms "that it was executed free of fraud,
duress, mistake, and undue influence by a competent testator." It is unclear at the time of
this writing whether the 1977 legislature intended to supersede the ch. 77-87 amendment
when it enacted ch. 77-174, or whether the legislature overlooked the fact that the technical
amendment of ch. 77-174 would have the effect of repealing the substantive change enacted
earlier in the session.
The problem with the original "competency of the testator" language is that the statute
could be construed to permit collateral litigation of the issues of fraud, duress, etc., because
a testator could be deemed competent and still execute a will tainted by fraud.
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(1) Until admitted to probate in this state or in the state
where the decedent was domiciled, the will shall be ineffective to
prove title to ... property of the testator.
(2) In any collateral action or proceeding relating to de-
vised property, the probate of a will in Florida shall be conclusive
of its due execution; that it was executed by a competent testator
•.. and of the fact that the will was unrevoked on the testator's
death.
Under the 1974 FPC, this section provided that the will of a Florida
resident was ineffective to prove title to property unless the will was
admitted to probate in Florida.'49 In 1975, the legislature amended
this section to remove this vestige of parochialism. 50 The new provi-
sion permits proof of title by a will admitted to probate in Florida
or in the state where the decedent was domiciled. It is important to
note that under section 731.201,11 "residence" and "domicile" are
equivalent terms.' 2 Thus, where a decedent had two residences, this
provision would be applicable to a will probated in either residence.
This change eliminates unnecessary proceedings and expenses by
recognizing that other states, as well as Florida, are competent to
probate wills, establish their validity and protect interests in Flor-
ida property.
Unfortunately, the legislature chose to retain its parochial
views in section 733.103(2) of the Florida Statutes (1977), and only
Florida probated wills are protected from collateral attack. Perhaps
this can be justified on the grounds that Florida may have different
standards in determining due execution, competency and prior re-
vocation, and may want to protect Florida residents under Florida
standards. This policy consideration, however, is outweighed by the
need for finality and the elimination of unnecessary expenses.
The Florida legislature responded to another early criticism of
the 1974 FPC by amending section 733.104, 13 which governs the
effect of the decedent's death on the generally applicable statute of
limitations. The 1974 FPC provided that the statute of limitations
on a decedent's cause of action would be suspended for twelve
months after the issuance of letters of administration in favor of the
personal representative.'54 However, the legislature omitted the
149. FLA. STAT. § 733.103 (Supp. 1974)(amended 1974); see Fenn & Koren, supra note
3, at 618.
150. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, § 48. This change was recommended in Fenn & Koren,
supra note 3, at 618.
151. FLA. STAT. § 731.201 (1977).
152. See note 9 supra.
153. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-174, § 1 (amending FLA. STAT. § 733.104 (1975)).
154. FLA. STAT. § 733.104 (Supp. 1974)(amended 1975).
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counterpart section' 5 of the former probate laws, which provided for
the suspension of the statute of limitations in favor of a creditor
after a claim has been filed against the deceased debtor's estate.
The 1975 amendment corrected this error by inserting a similar
provision into section 733.104(2).111
Prior to this insertion, however, the language of the predecessor
statute was amended. The amendment is significant since it
changes prior case law. The former probate law provided that "[i]f
a person against whom a cause of action exists dies before the expi-
ration of the time limited for commencement thereof and the cause
of action survives, claim shall be filed thereon and like proceedings
had as in the case of other claims against the estate."'57 The current
provision adds to the former section the phrase: "notwithstanding
the expiration of the time limited for commencement of the action."
The addition of this phrase should effectively overrule Azaroglu
v. Jordan.'58 In that case the District Court of Appeal, Third Dis-
trict, held that the wage claims statute of limitations prohibited the
claimant from recovering back wages in an action against the dece-
dent's estate, despite the timely filing of the claim in the probate
court. The court based its ruling upon the principle that "when two
statutes of limitation are applicable to a particular situation, both
statutes limit the time in which an action may be brought and the
dilatory litigant is caught by whichever runs first."'59 The current
statute should make it clear that, in such a case, the only applicable
statute of limitation is section 733.104. Thus, there is no conflict
between two statutes of limitation and the principle enunciated in
Azaroglu is inapplicable.
The one remaining problem with section 733.140 is its title,
which indicates that the section applies only to personal representa-
tives.' 0 The title should be amended to read: "Suspension of stat-
utes of limitation in favor of the personal representative and claim-
ants."'"' Such an amendment would reflect accurately the contents
of the statute.
Another of the generally applicable provisions of part I, section
155. FLA. STAT. § 734.28 (1973)(amended 1974).
156. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, § 48 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 733.104(2) (1977)).
157. FLA. STAT. § 734.28 (1973)(amended 1974).
158. 270 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972), cert. denied, 275 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1973).
159. Id. at 423.
160. FLA. STAT. § 733.104 (1977) is entitled: "Suspension of statutes of limitation in favor
of the personal representative." This corresponds to the title of FLA. STAT. § 734.27 (1973),
from which subparagraph (1) of § 733.104 is derived.
161. Fla. Stat. § 734.28 (1973), from which subparagraph (2) of § 733.104 is derived, was
entitled: "Suspension of statutes of limitations in favor of claimants."
1182 [Vol. 32:1157
PROBATE CODE
733.105, 162 governs the procedures to be followed in the determina-
tion of beneficiaries. The 1974 FPC required a hearing prior to the
entry of an order determining a beneficiary's entitlement to a por-
tion of the decedent's estate, but did not require any formal notice
prior to the hearing. 8 3 In 1975, the legislature amended this section
specifically to require such formal notice to all interested persons
except creditors." 4 Although prior to this amendment informal no-
tice was required under the Florida Probate and Guardianship Rule
5.040, the more stringent requirement of formal notice is well
founded.' Formal notice insures that the proper person will receive
the notice, and provides a convenient method of proof in the event
of a dispute over the receipt of notice.
The payment of costs and attorney's fees in probate proceed-
ings, other than those incurred in connection with the personal rep-
resentative,' is governed by section 733.106.17 Under this section,
there are two situations in which attorney's fees may be awarded.
The first is where the person nominated as personal representative
of the last known will in good faith offers the will for probate, even
though he is unsuccessful. 8 The second situation occurs when an
162. FLA. STAT. § 733.105 (1977).
163. FLA. STAT. § 733.105(2) (Supp. 1974)(amended 1975).
164. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, § 48.
165. The primary difference between formal and informal notice is that informal notice
only requires service by regular mail or delivery. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.040. Formal notice
requires either service by a form of mail requiring a signed receipt, service of process by the
sheriff pursuant to FLA. STAT. §§ 48.011-.23 (1977) or constructive service of process pursuant
to id. §§ 49.011-.12.
166. FLA. STAT. § 733.617 (1977) governs compensation of personal representatives and
professionals, including attorneys, employed by the personal representative.
167. Id. § 733.106.
168. This situation was derived from FLA. STAT. § 732.14(3) (1973), was enacted in §
733.106 of the 1974 FPC, and remains virtually unchanged in the current provision. The
District Court of Appeal, Third District, recently examined the "good faith" requirement in
In re Estate of Weinstein, 339 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976)(per curiam). There, Gabrielle
Nash, the unsuccessful proponent of a will, was the sole beneficiary under a will executed on
May 29, 1973. Another will, dated May 24, 1973, was presented at the same time to the
probate court. The May 24th will named the decedent's children and grandchildren as pri-
mary beneficiaries and was subsequently probated as the decedent's last will and testament.
The trial court predicated its award of attorney's fees to Nash on its findings of fact.
First, the decedent died with three known wills: a November, 1972 will in which his children
and grandchildren were substantially disinherited; a May 24, 1973 will in favor of the chil-
dren and grandchildren; and a May 29, 1973 will in favor of Nash. Secondly, on April 23,
1973, the decedent entered into a contract for the sale of land to Nash. In a subsequent court
proceeding which challenged the validity of this contract, the decedent was found competent
to enter into the contract.
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, held that under these facts the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in finding that Nash and her attorney were justified in believing
that the decedent was competent at the time he executed the will and in offering the will for
probate.
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attorney "has rendered services to an estate," although not em-
ployed by the personal representative. This second situation, al-
though enacted under the old probate laws," 9 was omitted from the
1974 FPC.7 " The current provision 7' was inserted in a 1975 amend-
ment.' Unfortunately, the legislature bypassed an opportunity to
clarify the meaning of the phrase "services to an estate."'7 Thus, it
appears that the test will remain one of pecuniary benefit to the
estate.
Utilizing the pecuniary benefit test, the probate court in In re
Estate of Freedman'74 properly refused to award attorney's fees to
the surviving daughter of the decedent. The daughter had success-
fully brought an independent action to impress a constructive trust
on legacies bequeathed to her two half-sisters."' In affirming the
action of the probate court, the District Court of Appeal, Third
District, emphasized that "the distribution was not changed, but
rather a constructive trust was placed on the distributive share of
the legatees by means of a separate action ... [and] the estate was
not enhanced thereby."'76 Thus, although apparently some type of
fraudulent or other misuse of the estate's assets was prevented,
there was no "service to the estate" and attorney's fees could not
be awarded. Cases such as this should serve to encourage the Florida
legislature to amend section 733.106 to provide attorney's fees for
nonpecuniary services to the estate.
Section 733.109, "1 the final section of chapter 733, part I, of the
Florida Statutes (1977), delineates the persons entitled to bring a
petition for revocation of probate and sets forth the effect of such
revocation.' Under the 1974 FPC, this statute provided that, ex-
169. FLA. STAT. § 734.01(2) (1973)(repealed 1974).
170. This omission was criticized in Fenn & Koren, supra note 3, at 679-80.
171. FLA. STAT. § 733.106 (1977).
172. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, § 49.
173. The problems encountered in the construction of this language are discussed in
Fenn & Koren, supra note 3, at 679-81.
174. 340 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977)(per curiam).
175. Although the opinion of the court does not recite any facts surrounding the imposi-
tion of the constructive trust, it is safe to assume that it was imposed to effectuate an
equitable distribution of property or otherwise prevent some fraudulent use of the property.
See 33 FLA. JUR. Trusts §§ 61-71 (1960). In addition, the court does not indicate whether this
case arose under the old or new probate laws. This omission by the court, however, seems
insignificant in light of the substantial similarity between the old and new provisions.
176. 340 So. 2d at 1275.
177. FLA. STAT. § 733.109 (1977).
178. The 1977 amendments to this statute create confusion similar to that encountered
in connection with FLA. STAT. § 733.103 (1975). See note 148 supra. The substantive amend-
ment in 1'977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-87 was effectviely repealed by the technical amendment of
id. ch. 77-104. The necessity for the reinsertion of the substantive amendment is discussed
in the text accompanying notes 183-90 infra. The current statute provides:
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cept for limiting distributions, the pendency of a revocation pro-
ceeding would not interfere with the administration of the estate by
the personal representative, and that the subsequent revocation of
probate would not affect the rights of a good faith purchaser of
property from the personal representative.' 9
Another statute, section 733.212,80 delineated the persons enti-
tled to file objections challenging the validity of the will and the
attendant procedures to be followed. Under section 733.212, all
"interested persons" were permitted to file objections. Early com-
mentators'8 ' criticized this provision because of the very broad defi-
nition given to the term "interested persons" under the 1974 FPC.'8
In 1975, amendments by the Florida Legislature narrowed the scope
of section 733.212'13 and, in effect, transferred a part of this section
into section 733.109.84 The 1975 changes limited the application of
section 733.212 to interested persons to whom notice of administra-
tion was mailed by the personal representative. This class of inter-
ested persons is implicitly defined by section 733.212(1), which re-
quires the personal representative to serve notice only to the surviv-
ing spouse and all known beneficiaries. The personal representative
Revocation of probate.-
(1) Any interested person, including a beneficiary under a prior will, except
those barred under s. 733.212 or s. 733.2123, may, before final discharge of the
personal representative, petition the court in which the will was admitted to
probate for revocation of probate.
(a) The petition shall state the interest of the petitioner and the grounds
for revocation.
(b) The petition shall be served upon the personal representative and all
interested persons by formal notice, and thereafter proceedings shall be con-
ducted as an adversary proceeding under the rules of civil procedure.
(2) Pending the determination of any petition for revocation of probate, the
personal representative shall proceed with the administration of the estate as if
no revocation proceeding had been commenced, except that no distribution may
be made to devisees in contravention of the rights of those who, but for the will,
would be entitled to the property disposed of.
(3) Revocation of probate of a will shall not affect or impair the title to the
property theretofore purchased in good faith for value from the personal repre-
sentative.
FLA. STAT. § 733.109 (1977).
179. FLA. STAT. § 733.109 (Supp. 1974)(amended 1975).
180. Id. § 733.212. There is some confusion regarding the section number of this statute.
In 1974 Fla. Laws, ch. 74-106, § 1 and 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-220, § 60, as well as in Fenn &
Koren, supra note 3, passim, this statute is numbered § 733.210. In the official codification,
however, the section is referred to as FLA. STAT. § 733.212 (1977).
181. See Fenn & Koren, supra note 3, at 637-38.
182. FLA. STAT. § 731.201(17) (Supp. 1974)(amended 1975). As discussed in the text
accompanying notes 27-29 supra, the definition of "interested person" was narrowed by the
1975 legislature.
183. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, § 60.
184. Id. § 50.
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may, in addition, serve notice to other heirs or devisees under a
known prior will. Thus the trigger that brings section 733.212 into
operation is the notice given by the administrator. Once the notice
is given, the notified person has three months to file any objections
or claims against the estate.
A concurrent amendment to section 733.109 expanded that sec-
tion to define another class of persons entitled to petition the court
for revocation of probate. 5 The new class was defined by the 1975
legislature to include "[alny beneficiary, including a beneficiary
under a prior will."'88 A beneficiary is defined as an "heir at law, in
an intestate estate; devisee, in a testate estate; and the owner of a
beneficial interest, in a trust."'8 7 Thus under section 733.109, an heir
at law in a testate estate, who by definition is not a beneficiary,
cannot use this section to challenge the validity of a will.'88
In short, there is no way for an heir at law to challenge the
validity of a will that excludes him, unless the personal representa-
tive has gratuitously given him notice of administration under sec-
tion 733.212. Even then, it is unclear whether he would be able to
make such a challenge, since section 733.212 could be interpreted
as a provision which governs only the time limit in which a claim
can be made, rather than empowering persons excluded from sec-
tion 733.109 to file objections.'89 The legislature should remedy this
confusion and simplify the revocation procedures by returning to
the concept that an interested person may petition to revoke pro-
bate. Similarly, notice of administration ought to be served upon
these same interested persons, rather than a select few at the discre-
tion of the personal representative. In the final analysis, due process
principles seem to require that "person[s] who may reasonably be




should be given notice of that proceeding and likewise, those persons
ought to be able to challenge the validity of that proceeding (i.e.,
the probate of the will).
185. Id.
186. Id. (current version at FLA. STAT. § 733.109 (1977)).
187. FLA. STAT. § 731.201(2) (1977).
188. It is interesting to note that the 1977 legislature remedied this defect with the
enactment of 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-87, § 18, in which the term "beneficiary" was changed
to "interested person." Under the current definition of interested person, this would appear
to protect the necessary persons without opening a floodgate of litigation which could result
in undue delay and expense. Unfortunately, in 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-104, § 227, the term
"interested person" was changed back to "beneficiary."
189. This possible interpretation is supported by the statutory classification of § 733.109
in part I, which sets forth general provisions, and the classification of § 733.212 in part II,
which delineates the procedures to be followed by the personal representative in commencing
administration.




Chapter 733, part II of the Florida Statutes (1977) delineates
the procedures and prerequisites for the admission of a will to pro-
bate and for the appointment of a personal representative. The first
statute in this part, section 733.201,11' governs the initial proof re-
quired prior to the admission of a will to probate. In the 1974 FPC,
this statute provided:
(1) Wills other than wills that are self-proved may be ad-
mitted to probate upon the oath of any attesting witness ....
(2) If it appears to the court that the attesting witnesses
[are unavailable] a will may be admitted to probate upon the
oath of the personal representative ... whether he is interested
in the estate or not, or of any person having no interest in the
estate under the will, that he believes the writing exhibited to be
the true last will of the decedent. 9'
This section was criticized by early commentators'93 since it
omitted provisions regarding the admissions of self-proved wills into
probate. Another noted defect was that it permitted a court-
appointed personal representative as well as a personal representa-
tive nominated by will to give the requisite oath where the attesting
witnesses were unavailable.
The 1975 legislature amended this section to remedy these diffi-
culties.'94 First, a subsection was added to admit self-proved wills
into probate without further proof. Second, the legislature restricted
the provision which permits an oath by an interested person in cases
of unavailable attesting witnesses to personal representatives nomi-
nated by will.
After the will is admitted to probate, a verified petition for
administration may be filed.9 5 In certain cases, notice of this peti-
tion must be given prior to the entry of an order appointing a per-
sonal representative. Section 733.20396 governs the notice require-
ment. Under the 1974 FPC, the only notice required was to persons
entitled to equal or greater preference than the applicant as per-
sonal representative.'97 In 1975, a new subsection was added to re-
191. Id. § 733.201.
192. FLA. STAT. § 733.201 (Supp. 1974)(amended 1975).
193. Fenn & Koren, supra note 3, at 629-30.
194. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, § 51.
195. FLA. STAT. § 733.202 (1977).
196. Id. § 733.203.
197. The mandatory nature of the notice to persons entitled to preference over the
applicant is well established. Failure to give such notice will render the granting of letters of
administration void ab initio. In re Estate of Baker, 339 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976). In
Baker, the decedent's mother petitioned the court for letters of administration. At the time
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quire notice where "a caveat has been filed by an heir or a devisee
under a will other than that being offered for probate."'98 The proce-
dure to be followed is specified in another, otherwise discretionary,
statute, section 733.2123.'"1 This statute was also created by the
1975 legislature,00 and provides:
A petitioner may serve formal notice of his petition for ad-
ministration on interested persons. No person who is served with
formal notice of the petition for administration prior to the issu-
ance of letters or who has waived notice may challenge the valid-
ity of the will, testacy of the decedent, qualifications of the per-
sonal representative, venue, or jurisdiction of the court, except in
connection with the proceedings before issuance of letters.
The only remaining statute in this part which merits discussion
is section 733.207,1 which governs the establishment and probate
of lost or destroyed wills. This provision in the FPC is substantially
the same as the enactment in the 1973 probate laws. 02 It is well
the letters were granted, the court was informed that the decedent's widow had been badly
burned in the same accident which caused the death of her husband, and was therefore
incapacitated and unable to serve as administratrix. There was no explanation, however,
regarding the failure to serve notice to the widow as required by statute. See FLA. STAT. §
732.43(3) (1971)(the substantially similar predecessor to FLA. STAT. § 733.203(2) (1975)).
Therefore, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, held that the trial court properly
granted the widow's subsequent petition for the removal of the administratrix. The court,
however, failed to discuss the second prerequisite to the mandatory notice provision. That
is, in addition to being entitled to preference by statute, the person to whom notice must be
given must be qualified to act as administrator. Under both FLA. STAT. § 732.45 (1973), the
statute in effect at the time this case arose, and FLA. STAT. § 733.303(1)(b) (1977), the current
statute, the widow would not have been qualified to serve due to her physical incapacitation.
This, of course, does not answer the issue of whether the widow would be entitled to petition
the court for revocation of previously issued letters upon termination of her disability. Under
prior law, this would probably be permitted. See Fenn & Koren, supra note 3, at 632; cf. FLA.
STAT. § 732.46 (1973)(when a person otherwise entitled to preference is incompetent due to
minority at the time the letters are issued, he may petition the court for revocation of the
previously issued letters upon attaining majority). This section, however, was omitted from
the 1974 FPC, and under current law it is doubtful that such a change in personal representa-
tives would be granted. See Fenn & Koren, supra note 3, at 632. In this connection, it is
interesting to note that in 1977 the Florida Legislature amended Fla. Stat. § 733.301(5) (1975)
to provide for such a revocation petition by a "person who is entitled to and has not waived
preference over the person appointed at the time of his appointment." 1977 Fla. Laws, ch.
77-87, § 21 (emphasis added). Later in the session, however, id. ch. 77-174, § 1 was enacted
and the emphasized words were omitted. Since the Florida Statutes do not have legislative
histories, it is impossible to do more than speculate as to the significance of these changes.
For a discussion of similar problems with the multiple enactments of the 1977 legislature, see •
notes 148, 178 & 188 supra.
198. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, § 53..
199. FLA. STAT. § 733.2123 (1977).
200. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, § 60. Note that this statute was renumbered from §
733.211 in the session laws to § 733.2123 in the official reporter.
201. FLA. STAT. § 733.207 (1977).
202. FLA. STAT. § 732.27 (1973)(repealed 1974).
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settled that a lost will gives rise to the presumption that the testator
destroyed the will with the intention of revoking it.203 The District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, recently discussed the sufficiency
of evidence needed to rebut this presumption. In In re Estate of
Baird, 214 the trial court admitted to probate an executed copy of the
decedent's will and denied the petition brought by the heirs at law
to revoke probate. The will provided that in the event his wife
should predecease him, the decedent's estate should go to his wife's
sister, Barricklow. The wife predeceased the testator. Subsequent to
her death, the testator executed a codicil which reaffirmed the ear-
lier will and provided for the appointment of a personal representa-
tive. The decedent never remarried and lived alone until his death
three years later. The codicil was found in a box of business papers,
but the original will was never found. Thus a presumption arose that
the will had been revoked. Barricklow relied upon the following
evidence to sustain the validity of the executed copy: (1) at the time
the decedent's papers were discovered, which was shortly after his
death, his apartment (but not the box containing the papers) was
in a state of disarray and had been open and accessible to other
unknown persons; (2) up until the time of his death, the decedent
expressed his continued fondness and warm feelings for Barricklow
and her son; and (3) the decedent had become very forgetful toward
the end of his life. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
reversed the decision of the trial court and held that none of this
evidence was sufficient to rebut the presumption of revocation.
Treating each piece of evidence separately, the court grounded its
holding on the bases that: (1) the only person with an adverse inter-
est to the will was hundreds of miles away at all relevant times; (2)
statements of a decedent cannot serve alone to rebut the presump-
tion of revocation; and (3) evidence as to the decedent's mental
condition was insufficient to establish that he was incompetent dur-
ing the period in which he might have revoked his will.
This case illustrates both the dangers of permitting a testator
to execute a duplicate as well as an original will, namely allowing
the testator to mistakenly rely on the validity of the duplicate, and
the difficulty in rebutting the presumption of revocation.
203. See, e.g., Schaefer v. Voyle, 88 Fla. 170, 102 So. 7 (1924); In re Estate of Baird, 343
So. 2d 41 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
204. 343 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
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C. Priority to Administer and Qualifications of Personal
Representatives
Chapter 733, part III of the Florida Statutes (1977) delineates
the requisite qualifications and preferences which the probate court
must observe in the appointment of a personal representative. One
of the major objections to this part of the 1974 FPC was the confus-
ing language of section 733.301,05 which specifies statutory prefer-
ences in the appointment of a personal representative.'" 6 The confu-
sion was eliminated in a 1975 amendment which substantially re-
worded this section." 7 The current provision treats testate and in-
testate estates separately for purposes of determining preferences. 0 8
It also eliminates the prior conflict which permitted the majority in
interest in the estate to select a representative other than the person
nominated by will, or in the case of intestacy, the surviving
spouse. 0 There remains, however, one possible area of confusion.
The legislature has not made this statute applicable to the appoint-
ment of successor representatives. Section 733.307, which governs
205. FLA. STAT. § 733.301 (Supp. 1974)(amended 1975).
206. The difficulties with FLA. STAT. § 733.301 (Supp. 1974), were explained as follows:
It attempts to combine the preferences in the case of both testate and intestate
estates and, in so doing, compounds the difficulties the courts have experienced
under the present preference statutes. Moreover, it seems to violate the two basic
tenets for the selection of personal representatives: (1) "that a testator has the
right to name the person who, after his death, shall have charge of his estate,
provided that such person is not disqualified by law"; and (2) that where the
decedent has not chosen his personal representative, the right to administer
should follow the right to the property, since self-interest is the best assurance of
a careful and expeditious administration. To give letters to the "next of kin" in
the case of a testate estate where both the named executor and the spouse cannot
or do not desire to serve, will frequently be to entrust the estate to persons who
will not share in its distribution but who are attracted by the prospective fees.
The likelihood of this occurring is enhanced under the new statute ....
Fenn & Koren, supra note 3, at 632-33 (footnotes omitted).
207. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, § 62.
208. FLA. STAT. § 733.301 (1977). The pertinent portion of this statute provides:
In the granting of letters, the following preferences shall be observed:
(1) In testate estates:
(a) The personal representative, or his successor, nominated by the will or
pursuant to a power conferred in the will.
(b) The person selected by a majority in interest of the persons entitled to
the estate.
(c) A devisee under the will. If more than one devisee applies, the court may
exercise its discretion in selecting the one best qualified.
(2) In intestate estates:
(a) The surviving spouse.
(b) The person selected by a majority in interest of the heirs.
(c) The heir nearest in degree. If more than one applies, the court may




such a subsequent appointment, provides that "[n]o personal rep-
resentative of a personal representative as such shall be authorized
to administer the estate of the first decedent. On the death of the
sole or surviving personal representative, the court shall appoint a
successor personal representative to complete the administration of
the estate."2 "
Under section 733.307 the court is given unlimited discretion in
choosing a successor representative. The problems that may be cre-
ated are illustrated in In re Estate of Drummond." I There, the dece-
dent's son, Howard Drummond, was named by will as the sole bene-
ficiary and executor of the estate. Drummond qualified as executor
but died before the estate proceedings were completed. The remain-
ing matters were obtaining approval of the previously filed estate
tax return, filing an accounting and distributing the assets to Drum-
mond's estate. Jessie Smith was named as the sole executrix in
Drummond's will. She petitioned the probate court for appointment
as successor executrix of the estate of Drummond's mother. Carole
Hall, Drummond's daughter, also petitioned the probate court for
appointment as administratrix of her grandmother's estate. The
probate court appointed Hall as administratrix on the ground that
she was entitled to preference under section 732.44.12 The District
Court of Appeal, First District, reversed on the ground that section
732.44 applied only to intestate estates. The appellate court also
rejected Hall's contention that she was entitled to be named execu-
trix upon Drummond's death since she was named in the will as
contingent executrix in the event that Drummond predeceased the
testator. This rejection was based on the ground that the specified
contingency had never occurred. The court held that the only way
to fulfill the intent of the testatrix to have her estate administered
and distributed at Drummond's direction was to appoint Drum-
mond's executrix, Smith, as his successor. Furthermore, Smith was
not barred by the succession of administration statute"' since she
sought appointment as the executrix of the sole beneficiary, rather
than as the executrix of the executor.
Although the current preference statute, section 733.301, of the
Florida Statutes (1977), applies to both testate and intestate es-
210. FLA. STAT. § 733.307 (1977).
211. 341 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977). Although Drummond was based upon the 1973
probate laws, the result would be the same under the FPC since the current statute, FLA.
STAT. § 733.307 (1977), is substantially the same as its predecessor, FLA. STAT. § 732.52 (1973).
212. FLA. STAT. § 732.44 (1973). This is the predecessor statute to FLA. STAT. § 733.301
(1975)(amended 1977).
213. FLA. STAT. § 732.52 (1973)(current version at FLA. STAT. § 733.307 (1977)). See note
311 and accompanying text supra.
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tates, similar problems could arise under it. For example, subsec-
tion (3) of the statute provides that "[a] guardian of the property
of a ward who if competent would be entitled to appointment as, or
to select, a personal representative may exercise the right to select
the personal representative." '' Under this provision, the personal
representative of a deceased personal representative who is also a
beneficiary, may be entitled to appointment as the successor repre-
sentative. The crux of the argument supporting this statutory con-
struction is that the personal representative is in effect the guardian
of the deceased (and therefore incompetent) representative's prop-
erty. At the outset, it is important to note that under Drummond
the succession of administration statute is inapplicable since the
successor seeks appointment as the representative of a beneficiary.
This argument is supported by the definitional section of the Florida
Guardianship Law.1 5 A "guardian" is defined as one to whom the
law has entrusted the custody and control of the property of an
incompetent. 2 1 An "incompetent" includes a person who, because
of any physical or mental incapacity, is incapable of managing his
property." 7 A deceased person is therefore incompetent, and a per-
sonal representative has custody and control of the decedent's prop-
erty. Thus, the requisites of guardianship are present, and section
733.301(3) is applicable. t5 If the legislature did not intend this inter-
pretation, it should clarify either the successor representative stat-
ute or section 733.301(3) in this regard.
In addition to compliance with the preference statute just dis-
cussed, the probate court must determine whether the person enti-
tled to preference is otherwise qualified to serve as personal repre-
sentative. Sections 733.302,11 733.3032 and 733.304121 govern this
determination.
Section 733.302 requires a personal representative to be both a
citizen of the United States and a resident of Florida.2 2 In In re
214. FLA. STAT. § 733.301(3) (1977).
215. Id. § 744.102.
216. Id. § 744.102(1).
217. Id. § 744.102(5).
218. It is interesting to note that the 1977 Florida Legislature amended FLA. STAT. §
733.507 (1975), which provides for the appointment of a successor personal representative
upon the removal or resignation of the initial personal representative, by adding the require-
ment that the preferences specified in § 733.301 be observed in such appointments. 1977 Fla.
Laws, ch. 77-87, § 26.
219. FLA. STAT. § 733.302 (1977).
220. Id. § 733.303.
221. Id. § 733.304.
222. FLA. STAT. § 733.302 (1977), entitled "Who may be appointed personal representa-
tive," provides that "[s]ubject to the limitations in this part, any person sui juris who is a
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Estate of Fernandez, 2 3 the Supreme Court of Florida held unconsti-
tutional the United States citizenship requirement2s4 The Florida
Legislature should amend this statute by eliminating the unconsti-
tutional requirement.
The remaining portion of this statute, which imposes the Flor-
ida residency requirement, should be combined with section
733.304, which specifies exceptions to the residency requirement. 25
A combined statute should facilitate proper statutory construction
and eliminate problems such as the one presented in In re Jama.2 1,
In Jama, the decedent died at sea while a crew member of a United
States flagship. Pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 6262 his wages were paid
into the registry of the federal district court. His wife, a domiciliary
of Kenya, East Africa, filed a petition to obtain the wages and
effects of the decedent. Under the facts of this case, 46 U.S.C. § 627
required the court to pay the wages and personal effects of the
decedent to the legal personal representative of the decedent. The
Kenyan personal representative was not qualified, however, since
Kenyan law does not authorize a representative to dispose of assets
of a decedent where those assets are located outside of Kenya.
Therefore, in order to determine the representative to whom the
funds should be paid, the court adopted Florida probate law. 22 The
citizen of the United States and a resident of Florida at the time of the death of the person
whose estate he seeks to administer is qualified to act as personal representative in Florida."
223. 335 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 1976).
224. In Fernandez, the trial court denied letters of administration to the decedent's
husband on the grounds that he was not a United States citizen. On appeal, the Supreme
Court of Florida reversed, holding that this requirement created a suspect classification based
upon alienage and was violative of the equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment
to the Constitution of the United States and article I, section 2 of the Constitution of Florida.
The state's attempt to sustain the validity of the statute on the grounds that: (1) a citizen is
more likely than an alien to possess the practical experience, education and understanding
of the English language necessary to administer an estate effectively; and (2) a citizen is more
likely than an alien to be amenable to the service of court process, was rejected by the court.
The first asserted interest is adequately protected by the competency requirement in FLA.
STAT. § 733.302 (1977), and the bond requirement in § 733.402(1). The second interest is
adequately protected by the residency requirement in § 733.302, the general service of process
statute, § 48.031, and the Florida long arm statute, § 48.193.
225. FLA. STAT. § 733.304 (1977), entitled "Nonresidents," provides:
A person who is not domiciled in the state cannot qualify as personal representa-
tive unless the person is:
(1) A legally adopted child or adoptive parent of the decedent;
(2) Related by lineal consanguinity to the decedent;
(3) A spouse or a brother, sister, uncle, aunt, nephew, or niece of the dece-
dent; or
(4) The spouse of a person otherwise qualified under this section.
226. 436 F. Supp. 963 (M.D. Fla. 1977).
227. 46 U.S.C. § 626 (1970).
228. There is no federal law regarding the appointment of personal representatives in
such cases.
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court rejected the widow's petition on the grounds that she did not
qualify since she was not a Florida resident.2 '9 The court stated that
it would be "imprudent" to appoint her representative since she was
in Kenya, and not subject to the court's jurisdiction. This analysis
fails to consider the effect of section 733.304, which permits a non-
domiciliary spouse to qualify as personal representative.23 ° The
court also failed to note that under section 734.102(1),31 where the
decedent dies intestate and the foreign domiciliary personal repre-
sentative is not qualified to act in Florida, the preference statute
applies. Thus, in Jama, the decedent's widow should have been
appointed personal representative.
D. Appointment of Personal Representative: Bonds
Once a court determines that a person is entitled and qualified
to be personal representative pursuant to part III of the FPC, the
next step is to appoint that person and determine the appropriate
bond. This procedure is prescribed under part IV of the FPC. The
only noteworthy change in this part since the 1974 FPC is the 1977
amendment of section 733.401.32 Prior to the amendment, this sec-
tion provided:
Issuance of letters-
(1) After the petition for administration is filed:
(a) The will, if any, shall be proved as provided elsewhere
in this code and shall be admitted to probate.
(b) The court shall appoint the person entitled and quali-
fied to be personal representative.
(c) The court shall determine the amount of any bond re-
quired under this part. The clerk may approve the bond in the
amount determined by the court and shall not charge a service
fee.
(d) Any required oath or designation of, and acceptance by,
a resident agent shall be filed.
(2) Upon compliance with all of the foregoing, letters shall
be issued to the personal representative.
(3) The failure to file any items under subsections (c) and
(d) shall not be jurisdictional. '33
The 1977 amendment amended subsection (3), which now provides
that "(3) Mistaken noncompliance with any of the requirements of
229. 436 F. Supp. at 966.
230. FLA. STAT. § 733.304(3) (1977).
231. Id. § 734.102(1).
232. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-87, § 23 (amending FLA. STAT. § 733.401 (1975)).
233. FLA. STAT. § 733.401 (1975)(amended 1977).
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subsection (1) shall not be jurisdictional."2"' This amendment seems
advantageous since it will permit correction of all mistaken noncom-
pliance with minimal disruption of the ongoing probate proceed-
ings.
E. Curators; Successor Personal Representatives; Removal
Chapter 733, part V of the Florida Statutes (1977) specifies the
procedures concerning the interruption of administration due to the
resignation or removal of the personal representative. Aside from
the previously discussed amendment to section 733.507,133 the only
recent developments in this part concern section 733.504,35 which
specifies the causes of removal of personal representatives. The 1974
FPC omitted the section of the 1973 probate laws that permitted
removal upon "[flailure of the resident personal representative
removing from the state to designate a resident agent. 2 37 In 1975,
the legislature rectified this omission by providing for the removal
of a personal representative who removes his domicile from Florida
if he is no longer qualified under part III of chapter 733.Y5 The
234. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-87, § 23.
235. See note 218 supra.
236. FLA. STAT. § 733.504 (1977) provides:
Causes of removal of personal representative.-
A personal representative may be removed and his letters revoked for any of the
following causes, and the removal shall be in addition to any penalties prescribed
by law:
(1) Adjudication of incompetency.
(2) Physical or mental incapacity rendering him incapable of the discharge
of his duties.
(3) Failure to comply with any order of the court, unless the order has been
superseded on appeal.
(4) Failure to account for the sale of property or to produce and exhibit the
assets of the estate when so required.
(5) The wasting or maladministration of the estate.
(6) Failure to give bond or security for any purpose.
(7) Conviction of a felony.
(8) Insolvency of, or the appointment of a receiver or liquidator for, any
corporate personal representative.
(9) The holding or acquiring by the personal representative of conflicting
or adverse interests against the estate that will or may adversely interfere with
the administration of the estate as a whole. This cause of removal shall not apply
to the surviving spouse because of the exercise of the right to the elective share,
family allowance, or exemptions, as provided elsewhere in this code.
(10) Revocation of the probate of the decedent's will that authorized or
designated the appointment of such personal representative.
(11) Removal of domicile from Florida, if the personal representative is no
longer qualified under part M of this chapter.
237. FLA. STAT. § 734.11 (1973)(amended 1974). For a discussion regarding the conse-
quences of the omission, see Fenn & Koren, supra note 3, at 631-32, 643-44.
238. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, § 69 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 733.504 (1977)).
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amended provision is stricter than the one in the 1973 probate laws
since it provides for removal whenever a personal representative
leaves the state, whether or not a resident agent has been appointed.
The provision is undesirable since the appointment of a new repre-
sentative may involve substantial cost and interested persons are
adequately protected by the appointment of a resident agent. Par-
ticularly in a case where there are few remaining duties, such ap-
pointment is unnecessary to the efficient completion of administra-
tion.3
It is important to note that removal of a personal representative
lies within the sound discretion of the court and that the specified
causes are permissive and not mandatory. This is illustrated in In
re Estate of Murphy,4 0 where the District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, refused to reverse the trial court's denial of a motion by the
sole beneficiary to remove a co-personal representative. The
grounds alleged for removal were the failure to timely file account-
ings, the obtention without notice of an order allowing partial attor-
ney's fees, and the disenchantment of the sole beneficiary with the
co-personal representative. The appellate court emphasized that
the personal representative was personally chosen by the decedent
to manage his estate and that the trial court could have properly
found that the continued service of the personal representative
would not prejudice or endanger the estate. The Murphy decision
illustrates the broad discretion given to the trial court in determin-
ing whether to remove a representative.
F. Duties and Powers of Personal Representatives
Part VI of the FPC specifies the manner in which the personal
representative should administer the estate. Section 733.60241 de-
scribes the general duties of the personal representative. Under the
1974 FPC, this section provided that the personal representative
had a fiduciary obligation only to the beneficiaries of the estate.
Early commentators noted that this provision changed existing case
The exceptions to the domiciliary requirement are listed in FLA. STAT. § 733.304 (1977). For
further discussion of this subsection, see the text accompanying note 225 supra.
239. Although, as noted in Fenn & Koren, supra note 3, at 631, the current FPC elimi-
nates the former provision which required designation of a resident agent prior to the issuance
of letters of administrration, FLA. STAT. § 732.45(2) (1973), the current FLA. PROB. & GUARD.
RULE 5.110 still requires such appointment. Furthermore, the committee note indicates that
this requirement is the implementation of FA. STAT. § 733.401(1)(d)(1977). Thus, as the Fenn
& Koren article previously surmised, the legislature's omission was not a desire to eliminate
this requirement, but only to treat it as a procedural rather than jurisdictional matter. Fenn
& Koren, supra note 3, at 631-32.
240. 336 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
241. FLA. STAT. § 733.602 (1977).
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law since it did not impose a fiduciary obligation on the personal
representative to creditors of the estate."' An early 1977 amendment
corrected this omission by providing that the personal representa-
tive should use his authority for the best interests of interested
persons.2 3 As previously discussed, the term "interested persons"
includes creditors.2 14 Under a subsequent enactment, however, the
statutory language was changed from "interested persons" back to
"beneficiaries. ' 245 This subsequent amendment was technical in
nature, and as previously discussed,2" the legislature probably did
not intend it to supersede the earlier substantive amendment. This
confusion illustrates the need for more careful legislative draftsman-
ship and a legislative history to determine the intent of the legisla-
tors.
Another early criticism 2 7 of the 1974 FPC was directed against
section 733.607,245 which permitted the personal representative to
acquire the estate, and section 733.608,249 which permitted the per-
sonal representative to dispose of assets to fulfill various obliga-
tions. 250 Neither of these statutes excludes the homestead from its
operation. Therefore, under these statutes, the personal representa-
tive would be allowed to oust the surviving spouse of possession and
dispose of the homestead. In 1977, the legislature responded to this
problem by amending both statutes to exclude the homestead.251
The specific transactions in which the personal representative
may engage are set forth in section 733.612.22 This section is derived
from the UPC and is designed to give the personal representative
broad discretion in administering the estate and thereby reduce
unnecessary transaction costs. 213 Commentators 4 criticized this
section since it omitted the UPC provision which specifically gave
the personal representative the power to "act without independent
investigation upon [an agent's] recommendations; and instead of
242. Fenn & Koren, supra note 3, at 646 n.604.
243. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-87, § 27.
244. See text accompanying notes 27-29, 182 supra.
245. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-174 § 1.
246. See notes 148, 178, 188 supra.
247. See Fenn & Koren, supra note 3, at 649.
248. FLA. STAT. § 733.607 (Supp. 1974)(amended 1977).
249. Id. § 733.608.
250. Section 733.608 specifies these obligations as: "(1) For the payment of devises,
debts, family allowance, estate and inheritance taxes, claims, charges, and expenses of ad-
ministration; (2) To enforce contribution and equalize advancement; and (3) For distribu-
tion." FLA. STAT. § 733.608 (1977).
251. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-87, §§ 28 & 29.
252. FLA. STAT. § 733.612 (1977).
253. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-715.
254. Fenn & Koren, supra note 3, at 654-55.
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acting personally, employ one or more agents to perform any act of
administration, whether or not discretionary. ' 25' The 1975 legisla-
ture remedied this omission by inserting the above quoted language
into section 733.612(19), which now provides:
[A] personal representative ... may properly:
(19) Employ persons, including attorneys, accountants, aud-
itors, investment advisors, and others, even if they are one and
the same as the personal representative or are associated with the
personal representative, to advise or assist the personal repre-
sentative in the performance of his administrative duties; act
upon the recommendations of such employed persons without
independent investigation; and, instead of acting personally,
employ one or more agents to perform any act of administration,
whether or not discretionary.258
This amendment, in conjunction with the remainder of the statute,
gives the personal representative the flexibility to manage the estate
in an efficient manner.
The personal representative's power to dispose of real property
is governed by section 733.613.57 Where the decedent dies intestate
or where no power of sale has been conferred upon the personal
representative by will, this section gives the personal representative
power to sell property when it is in the best interests of the estate.
Title passes when the sale is authorized and confirmed by the court.
Furthermore, bona fide purchasers are not required to examine any
proceedings before the order of sale. Apparently, this provision pro-
tects bona fide purchasers so long as the order of sale by the court
is valid on its face. Section 733.613 should facilitate the sale of real
property by eliminating the problems encountered by purchasers of
real property under the 1973 probate laws,"8 as illustrated in Neely
v. Bruten.25 1 There, the former administratrix of the decedent's es-
tate conveyed certain property to the Neelys. The conveyance was
made pursuant to the order of the county judge having charge of the
estate. Subsequent to this conveyance, the county judge vacated the
order at the instance of an heir who claimed to have had no notice
of the proposed sale. The Neelys were not parties to the estate
proceedings and they neither received notice nor had the opportun-
ity to be heard prior to the revocation of the order authorizing sale.
Subsequent to the revocation, the Neelys petitioned for reconsidera-
255. UMFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-715(21).
256. FLA. STAT. § 733.612(19) (1977).
257. Id. § 733.613.
258. FLA. STAT. §§ 733.26 & .28 (1973)(repealed 1974).
259. 339 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
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tion of the order which adversely affected their deed and title, and
for a declaratory judgment establishing the validity of their deed.
The trial court denied the petition for reconsideration and entered
summary judgment against the Neelys in the declaratory judgment
action. The basis for the trial court ruling was that all issues had
been determined by the order of revocation.6 0 The District Court of
Appeal, First District, reversed the judgment of the trial court on
the ground that the Neelys could not be bound by determinations
made by the probate court in proceedings to which they were not
parties. The problem with this case is that it does not recognize any
protection to bona fide purchasers who act pursuant to a court order
which is valid on its face. The concurring opinion by Chief Judge
Boyer underscores this problem.26' In his opinion, the Neelys were
not entitled under the law to either notice or a hearing in the pro-
bate proceedings. Therefore, the deed from the estate to the Neelys
was conclusively ineffective to convey title, and the only question
on remand was whether the Neelys otherwise had an interest in the
property.
Under the Neely rationale, a purchaser could safely acquire
property from an estate only after thoroughly investgating all pro-
ceedings surrounding the issuance of the court order. The deterrent
effect and expense of imposing this burden is. obvious. The FPC
provision should eliminate this hazard.
The compensation of the personal representative and his agents
is governed by section 733.617.262 This section provides that reasona-
ble compensation shall be paid, and enumerates the factors to be
considered in determining reasonableness." 3 Under the 1974 FPC,
an additional subsection provided:
(3) No compensation shall be paid to the personal repre-
sentative or attorneys, unless, prior to payment:
(a) All persons bearing the impact of the payment have
consented to the compensation or the method of determining
compensation in a signed writing filed in the proceeding; or
(b) The court has ordered the payment following notice of
the petition to all persons bearing the impact of the payment."4
260. The trial court emphasized that the order of revocation had been affirmed by the
District Court of Appeal, First District. Id. at 1128.
261. 339 So. 2d at 1128 (Boyer, C.J., concurring).
262. FLA. STAT. § 733.617 (1977).
263. Under the 1973 probate laws, such compensation was based solely upon the size of
the estate. FLA. STAT. § 734.01 (1973). See, e.g., In re Estate of Wylie, 342 So. 2d 996 (Fla.
4th Dist. 1977)(estate size computation excludes trust assets over which decedent had general
testamentary power of appointment).
264. FLA. STAT. § 733.617(3) (1975)(repealed 1976).
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In 1976, the legislature eliminated this cumbersome and expensive
procedure.265 In its place the legislature added section 733.6175,
which provides:
Proceedings for review of employment of agents and compen-
sation of personal representatives and employees of estate.-
After notice to all affected interested persons and upon petition
of an interested person bearing all or part of the impact of the
payment of compensation to the personal representative or any
person employed by him, the propriety of such employment and
the reasonableness of the compensation or payment may be re-
viewed by the court. The burden of proof of propriety of such
employment and the reasonableness of the compensation shall be
upon the personal representative and the person employed by
him. Any person who is determined to have received excessive
compensation from an estate for services rendered may be or-
dered to make appropriate refunds.2"
Thus the burden of allegation has been shifted to the person chal-
lenging the payment. This should avoid a significant number of
costly and unnecessary proceedings.
The final provision of part VI, section 733.619,267 concerns the
individual liability of the personal representative. The statute is
derived from the UPC118 and was added in 1975 after early commen-
tators objected to its" omission. 29 It protects the personal representa-
tive from personal liability in two instances: (1) a personal repre-
sentative is not personally liable on a contract into which he entered
in his fiduciary capacity, except a contract for attorney's fees, unless
he fails to reveal his representative capacity and identify the estate
in the contract; and (2) a personal representative is liable for obliga-
tions arising out of the estate and torts committed in the course of
administration only if he is personally at fault. The addition of this
statute is significant since under common law the representative
could be held personally liable on all contracts and for all torts.270
G. Creditors' Claims
Chapter 733, part VII of the Florida Statutes (1977) governs the
presentation and payment of claims against the estate. The time
limitation on the presentation of claims is specified in section
265. 1976 Fla. Laws, ch. 76-172, § 1.
266. FLA. STAT. § 733.6175 (1977).
267. Id. § 733.619.
268. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-808.




733.702.271 The provision is substantially the same as its predecessor
under the 1973 probate laws,272 and provides:
(1) No claim or demand against the decedent's estate that
arose before the death of the decedent .... whether due or not,
direct or contingent, ... shall be binding on an estate. . . unless
presented:
(a) Within 3 months from the time of the first publication
of the notice of administration, even though the personal repre-
sentative has recognized the claim or demand by paying a part
of it ....
(2) No cause of action . . . shall survive the death of the
person against whom the claim may be made, whether an action
is pending at the death of the person or not, unless the claim is
filed in the manner provided in this part and within the time
limited.
(3) Nothing in this section affects or prevents:
(a) A proceeding to enforce any ... lien on property of the
decedent. 73
Although it seems clear that the statute requires the filing of a
claim prior to payment, the courts have not strictly enforced this
requirement. In In re Estate of King,74 King, the decedent, had
entered into an option contract for the sale of certain property. The
option to purchase the property was exercisable during a specified
period of time after King's death. On the same day as the execution
of the option contract, King entered into an agreement with the
realtor involved in the transaction. The agreement provided for a
total brokerage commission of $100,000 to be paid when the option
was exercised. Periodic commission payments were deducted from
this fee. Subsequent to King's death, the optionee gave notice of his
intention to exercise the option. Thereupon, the co-executors of the
estate filed a petition for authority to sell the property and pay the
commission. The court granted this petition. Two months later, the
co-executors petitioned the court to amend its order by eliminating
the authorization of the commission. As grounds for this petition,
the co-executors stated that the realtor had not filed his claim for
the commission within the statutory time limitation. The trial court
granted this petition. The District Court of Appeal, Third District,
reversed, holding that the realtor's claim was not the type of contin-
271. FLA. STAT. § 733.702 (1977).
272. FLA. STAT. § 733.16 (1973)(repealed 1974).
273. FLA. STAT. § 733.702 (1977).
274. 338 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
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gent claim barred by the limitation statute. The appellate court did
not elaborate on this holding, but relied upon Denco, Inc. v. Belk. 75
There, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the notice of claim
provision did not apply to the exercise of an option in a lease. The
supreme court apparently found that the option fell within the ex-
ception for liens upon property. By extending this rationale to bro-
ker's fees, the King court has gone too far. The considerations that
support the property exception, where the requisite title examina-
tion prior to disposal will reveal any such claims, do not support the
exception of broker's fees from the filing of claims requirement. The
result reached in King is equitable, but a better rationale would
have been based upon unjust enrichment or quantum meruit recov-
ery.
Another exception to the mandatory filing requirement was
developed in In re Estate of Shaw."'6 There, prior to Shaw's death,
a judgment was entered against him in favor of his creditors. Shaw
filed a notice of appeal and, in lieu of supersedeas, deposited negoti-
able bonds in an escrow account. Shaw died while the appeal was
pending. His estate retained Shaw's counsel and pursued the ap-
peal. Counsel for the estate argued that failure to substitute the
estate was not fatal to any aspect of the proceedings. The creditors
prevailed on appeal, but the negotiable bonds only partially satis-
fied the judgment. Therefore, the creditors filed in the probate court
a motion to aid in the execution of judgment. The probate court
denied the motion on the ground that the creditors had failed to file
a claim against the estate within the statutory period. The District
Court of Appeal, Third District, reversed, holding:
Through the above acts, the estate made a general appearance
and the court acquired jurisdiction. In such cases the necessity
of a formal substitution of parties is dispensed with and the ap-
pearance is legally conclusive that the estate had notice of the
demand sued on well within the [statutory period of limita-
tion].'"
Under the Shaw holding, it appears that the notice requirement will
be waived whenever the estate appears and participates in pending
litigation. The decision is inconsistent with section 733.702(2) of the
Florida Statutes (1977). Furthermore, it disregards the rights of
interested persons other than the personal representative to object
to the claim. 8 A more consistent basis for this holding is equitable
275. 97 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1957).
276. 340 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
277. Id. at 507.
278. FLA. STAT. § 733.705 (1977).
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estoppel, since the representative lulled the creditors into a sense of
security by filing the affidavit regarding substitution. 79
The procedures for the payment of and objection to claims filed
is set forth in section 733.705.111 This statute provides, in part, that
where an objection to a claim is filed, the claimant must bring an
independent action within thirty days from the date of service of the
objection or the claim is barred. The court, however, may extend
this time limit for good cause. Section 733.705 has spawned more
litigation than any other section of the FPC.
One area of confusion has been the applicability of Rule 1.090
of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure to the thirty day time limit
for filing an independent action. This rule governs the computation
of time in civil actions, and provides in pertinent part:
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time pre-
scribed .... the day of the act, event or default from which the
designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The
last day of the period so computed shall be included unless it is
a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday in which event the period
shall run until the end of the next day which is neither a Satur-
day, Sunday or legal holiday. When the period of time prescribed
or allowed is less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sun-
days and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation.
(e) Additional Time After Service by Mail. When a party
has the right or is required to do some act or take some proceeding
within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other
paper upon him and the notice or paper is served upon him by
mail, three days shall be added to the prescribed period.2",
In Greer v. Estate of Smith,2 ' the District Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, held that Rule 1.090 was applicable to extend the
period in which to file a complaint, where the objection to the initial
claim was served by mail. The Greer case, however, arose under the
1973 probate laws,"' and the court specifically declined to express
an opinion as to the result under the 1974 FPC.2s4 The District Court
of Appeal, Third District, however, subsequently reached the same
result under the 1974 FPC in Public Health Trust v. Gavrilove.2 u
279. See generally 12 FLA. JUR. Estoppel and Waiver §§ 23-86 (1957).
280. FLA. STAT. § 733.705 (1977).
281. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.090.
282. 342 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
283. FLA. STAT. § 733.18(2) (1973)(repealed 1974).
284. 342 So. 2d at 1009.
285. 349 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
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The extension of time for good cause286 has also been the subject
of much litigation. In In re Estate of Pridgeon,5 7 the claimant filed
in the probate court a "petition for payment" of a claim, to which
the estate objected, rather than filing a separate action. The trial
court granted an extension of time to file the independent action.
It found that good cause existed due to confusion generated by the
recent transition to the FPC. The District Court of Appeal, First
District, affirmed the decision of the trial court. However, a strong
dissent by Judge Rawls emphasized that the FPC is even more
explicit than the former probate laws in requiring a separate action.
Furthermore, even if this were not the situation, ignorance of the
law could not constitute good cause as contemplated by the stat-
ute 288
Good cause was also found in In re Estate of Herskowitz.
2
11
There, the claimant was the former wife of the decedent. She filed
a claim, which represented an unpaid special equity adjudged
against the decedent as a part of the final judgment of divorce,
against the estate. The estate objected to this claim. The claimant
did not timely file an independent action and the probate court
refused to grant an extension of time. The District Court of Appeal,
Third District, reversed, holding that, as a matter of law, the claim-
ant had established good cause for such an extension. The following
factors were taken into consideration: (1) the claimant and her chil-
dren were totally dependent on the decedent; (2) the claimant was
forced to move from New York City to Florida to protect her rights
after the decedent's death; (3) the claimant had a succession of
short-term attorneys; and (4) the claimant's conversations with the
executor (the decedent's brother) and a family friend prior to filing
the claim led her to believe that the claim would be paid without
objections. In addition, the court emphasized:
It is undisputed not only that the executor knew of the hardship
to the children and their mother caused by his brother's death,
that he claimed that no funds were available and then condi-
tioned any help upon a payment of the judgment, but also that
he further conditioned that payment upon [an illegal] require-
ment that the claimant was to receive no money for her own use.
286. FLA. STAT. § 733.705(3) (1977). "Good cause" has been defined by the Supreme
Court of Florida "as a substantial reason, one that affords a legal excuse," or a "cause moving
the court to its conclusion, not arbitrary or contrary to all the evidence," and not mere
"ignorance of law, hardship on petitioner, and reliance on [another's] advice." In re Gold-
man's Estate, 79 So. 2d 846, 848 (Fla. 1955)(citations omitted).
287. 349 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
288. Id. at 742 (Rawls, J., dissenting).
289. 342 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
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It is further undisputed that the parties were not dealing at arm's
length, but in a claimed atmosphere of family concern.290
The major problem with this opinion is that the court never
specifically states why these facts constitute good cause. The opin-
ion appears to be based upon the familial nature of the dispute, but
good cause requires more than this.29' The court hints at seemingly
deceptive actions on the part of the executor, yet these actions took
place prior to the formal objection by the estate. The court also
mentions the claimant's succession of attorneys as a relevant con-
sideration. Perhaps the Herskowitz decision is best explained on the
basis that the court is unwilling to hold a lay person to the same
strict guidelines that are imposed upon a lawyer. If the claimant in
this case has been consistently represented by an attorney, none
of the other factors relied upon by the court would be sufficient to
constitute good cause.
In contrast to Herskowitz, the District Court of Appeal, Second
District, in Exchange National Bank v. Field,212 held that the pro-
bate court abused its discretion in finding good cause for an exten-
sion of time. There, notice of the executor's objections to the
claims was served upon the claimants on May 20. The executor
refused the claimants' request for a settlement on June 17. On July
9, the probate court granted the executor's motion for an extension
of time within which to file the inventory of the estate. The inven-
tory was filed on August 29. Three months later, the claimants filed
their motion for an extension of time. The claimants contended that
they delayed filing suit until they could examine the inventory tnd
determine whether the estate possessed sufficient assets to satisfy
the claims. The District Court of Appeal, Second District, held that
this did not constitute good cause under the Goldman standard,"'
particularly in-view of the three month post-inventory delay.
Aside from the direct effect of an objection, which requires the
claimant to file an independent action, there may also be collateral
effects that operate to the detriment of the claimant. These collat-
eral effects are illustrated in In re Estate of Shaw."9' There, Temple
Ner Tamid filed a claim to which the estate objected. Thereafter,
the Temple filed suit in the civil division of the circuit court. During
the pendency of the civil suit, the Temple petitioned the probate
court for an accounting of the assets of the estate, and for production
290. Id. at 532.
291. See note 286 supra.
292. 338 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
293. See note 286 supra.
294. 340 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
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of certain documents. The Temple alleged that the personal repre-
sentative was improperly administering the estate to the detriment
of the creditors. The probate court denied the petition on the ground
that the Temple was a contingent creditor, and therefore not an
interested party who would be entitled to such relief. The District
Court of Appeal, Third District, affirmed the decision of the probate
court. An important factor in Shaw was the court's belief that the
Temple was using the petition in bad faith, as a means of obtaining
information that it could not obtain through regular discovery pro-
ceedings in the pending civil litigation. The Shaw case should be
narrowly interpreted in light of this factor, so that estates will not
be permitted to avoid accountability to creditors merely by object-
ing to their claims.
H. Special Provisions for Distribution
After the claims against the estate are determined, as set forth
in part VII of chapter 733,99 the assets of the estate must be distrib-
uted, as provided in part VIII.2"1 This part governs the method and
order of distribution, as well as the consequences of improper distri-
bution and the apportionment of estate taxes.
The major criticism of this portion of the 1974 FPC was that it
lacked statutory coordination in two areas."7 The first area involved
the payment of an encumbrance on specifically devised property.
Section 733.803 of the 1974 FPC provided: "Encumbered property;
liability for payment.- The specific devisee of encumbered prop-
ertyshall be entitled to have the encumbrance on devised property
paid at the expense of the residue of the estate only when the will
shows such an intent.""29 This section was substantially duplicated
in section 733.804 of the 1974 FPC, which provided: "Non-
exoneration.- A specific devise passes subject to any security
interest existing at the date of death, without the rights of exonera-
tion, regardless of a general directive in the will to pay debts."2 9
The 1975 legislature eliminated the redundancy by repealing section
733.804300 and incorporating the "general directive" clause into sec-
tion 733.803.01
The other area of confusion in this part concerned the order in
295. FLA. STAT. §§ 733.701-.710 (1977).
296. Id. §§ 733.801-.817.
297. See Fenn & Koren, supra note 3, at 668-69.
298. FLA. STAT. § 733.803 (Supp. 1974)(amended 1975).
299. Id. § 733.804 (repealed 1975).
300. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, § 87.
301. Id. § 86.
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which assets were appropriated for distribution purposes, and
abatement and contribution where the assets were insufficient for
the full payment of debts, taxes, devises, etc. Under the 1974 FPC,
the order of appropriation was governed by section 733.805.302 The
abatement and contribution provision was contained in section
733.807.303 Early commentators noted that these two provisions were
two sides of the same coin and recommended their consolidation."'
The 1975 legislature followed this recommendation by repealing sec-
tion 733.807 and incorporating its provisions into section
733.805(2) .30
I. Closing Estates
Chapter 733, part IX of the Florida Statutes (1977) delineates
the procedures that must be followed by the personal representative
in distributing the assets and obtaining his discharge °.3 It also pro-
vides for subsequent administration in the event that new property
of the estate is discovered or other cause is shown for further admin-
istration .37
The 1977 legislature enacted a minor amendment to section
733.901(1), o0 which governs the contents of the petition for dis-
charge of the personal representative. The amendment eliminates
the prior requirement that the petition include the proposed distri-
bution of the assets of the estate, any prior dispositions that have
been made, and a statement that objections to the petition or pro-
posed distribution must be filed within thirty days. Although this
amendment eliminates some of the formalities required for closing.
the estate, it is still far from the efficient and informal procedures
for accounting and distribution that are advocated by the drafters
of the UPC.09
This concludes the analysis of the procedures for the formal
administration of estates. The remaining two chapters concern situ-
ations where an abbreviated procedure may be used.
302. FLA. STAT. § 733.805 (Supp. 1974)(amended 1975).
303. Id. § 733.807 (repealed 1975).
304. Fenn & Koren, supra note 3, at 668-69.
305. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, §§ 88 & 90.
306. See FLA. STAT. § 733.901 (1977).
307. Id. § 733.903.
308. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-87, § 42 and ch. 77-174 § 1 (amending FLA. STAT. §
733.901(1)(1975)).
309. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-1003 and Comment; Fenn & Koren, supra note 3,
at 671.
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V. FOREIGN PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES AND ANCILLARY
ADMINISTRATION
The disposition of the Florida assets of a nonresident decedent
is governed by chapter 734 of the FPC. Under section 733.702,310 all
claims against both resident and nonresident estates are barred if
not filed within three years. Section 733.702 also provides a method
by which the representative of a resident decedent's estate can expe-
dite the determination of claims.3  Under the 1974 FPC, the coun-
terpart to section 733.702 for the estates of nonresident decedents
was found in sections 734.10312 and 734.104.311 The 1977 legislature
consolidated these provisions and significantly amended the proce-
dures to expedite settlement of such claims. Under the 1974 FPC,
unless the will devised real property situated in Florida, 3 1 only the
personal representative could initiate such procedures.3 5 The 1977
amendment 3l' provides that either the personal representative or
any other person may initiate the proceedings. The 1974 FPC provi-
sion, however, applied to both testate and intestate estates, whereas
the 1977 enactment is limited to testate estates. " There appears to
be no valid reason to prejudice the estates of intestate decedents in
this manner, and the legislature should correct this inequity by
inserting the omitted provision.
The actual procedure for settling claims has remained substan-
tially the same under the 1977 amendment. The procedure is initi-
ated by filing a petition requesting the admission of the foreign
probated will to record. This petition must be accompanied by au-
thenticated copies of the will, the petition for probate, the order
admitting the will to probate, the letters of administration, and that
part of the domiciliary record that will show the names of the devi-
sees."' The 1977 enactment liberalizes the 1974 FPC provision by
providing that under certain circumstances the requirement for
these documents may be waived.35
310. FLA. STAT. § 733.702(1)(b) (1977).
311. Id. § 733.702(1)(a).
312. FLA. STAT. § 734.103 (1975)(current version at FLA. STAT. § 734.103 (1977)).
313. Id. § 734.104 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 734.103 (1977)).
314. Id.
315. Id. § 734.103(1) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 734.103(1)(1977)).
316. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-87, § 44 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 734.103(1) (1977)).
317. Compare FLA. STAT. § 734.103(1)(b) (1975)(amended 1977) with FLA. STAT. §
734.103(1) (1977).
318. FLA. STAT. § 734.103(1) (1977).
319. Id. This statute provides: "If any of the documents required under this subsection
are not a part of the domiciliary record, then, on proper proof thereof, the court may waive
the requirement for such documents or may require an affidavit of the petitioner reciting the
information not disclosed by the domiciliary record."
[Vol. 32:1157
PROBATE CODE
After the petition is granted, claims are determined in the
same manner as claims against a resident decedent's estate, as spec-
ified in chapter 733 of the Florida Statutes (1977).32"
VI. FAMILY ADMINISTRATION AND SMALL ESTATES
Chapter 735 of the FPC provides cert,/in estates with an alter-
native to the expensive and cumbersome administration procedures
specified in chapter 733.
Pursuant to chapter 735, part I of the Florida Statutes (1977),
certain estates may qualify for family administration. The proce-
dure is designed to effectuate the almost immediate distribution of
the assets of the decedent to his family, without the necessity of a
personal representative or the delay associated with the various
notice and claim procedures required under regular administration.
Under the 1974 FPC, family administration was available
where the only heirs or beneficiaries were the decedent's surviving
spouse and lineal descendants.32' Early commentators criticized this
narrow applicability.32 The 1975 legislature responded to this criti-
cism by extending the availability of family administration to in-
clude estates whose heirs and beneficiaries also included lineal as-
cendants, and in the case of testate estates, where specific or general
devises constituted only a minor part of the decedent's estate.323
The 1975 legislature, however, limited the operation of the fam-
ily administration provisions in one respect.2 4 This limitation is the
requirement that the estate consist solely of personal property. If
real property forms part of the estate, administration must proceed
under chapter 733 until the claims of creditors have been processed
or barred.2 This prerequisite will cause unnecessary delay and ex-
pense. Creditors are adequately protected, even where real property
is involved, since the petition for family administration must state
that there are no such claims outstanding,26 and if the petition is
erroneous, the petitioners remain liable for such claims until the
statute of limitations expires.2 7 Section 735.101 should be amended
to eliminate the requirement of commencing administration under
320. See text accompanying notes 271-94 supra.
321. FLA. STAT. § 735.101 & .103(1) (Supp. 1974)(current version at FLA. STAT. § 735.101
(1977)).
322. Fenn & Koren, supra note 3, at 687-89.
323. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-2020, § 101 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 735.101 (1977)).
324. Id.
325. FLA. STAT. § 735.101(5) (1977).
326. Id. § 735.103(3).
327. Id. § 735.107(3)(d).
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chapter 733, especially in cases where there are no claims of credi-
tors outstanding.
The legislature should also amend the limitation which re-
stricts family administration to estates which have a gross value of
less than $60,000.32 It has been suggested that this limitation was
imposed because estates of greater value are required to file a fed-
eral estate tax return, and thus family administration did not pro-
vide any real benefit.2 The 1976 Tax Reform Act, however, sub-
stantially changed the prior federal law in this regard.330 In 1977,
estates of less than $120,000 are not required to file federal estate
tax returns.33 ' This amount will be increased each year until 1981,
at which time estates with a value of less than $175,000 will be tax
exempt. 3 Therefore, the gross value limitation placed upon family
administration ought to be changed to accord with the changes in
the federal estate tax law.
Upon the probate court's determination that an estate will
qualify under chapter 735, family administration is commenced by
the filing of a verified petition by the beneficiaries and surviving
spouse of the decedent. 3 3 The petition must contain facts showing
that the estate qualifies, a complete list of assets and their esti-
mated value, and a statement that the estate is not indebted or
provisions for payment of debts has been made or that the claims
are barred. Under the 1974 FPC, the petition also had to set forth a
proposed schedule of distribution of assets.34 In 1977, however, the
legislature eliminated this requirement. 33 Upon filing this petition,
the will, if any, is admitted to probate and the assets may be distrib-
uted immediately.3 6
Another alternative to regular administration is the use of sum-
mary administration.37 The summary administration procedure,
however, may be used only in very limited circumstances. The dece-
dent's will must not direct administration and the value of the
estate subject to administration must not exceed $10,000. 338 Early
328. Id. § 735.101(4).
329. See Fenn & Koren, supra note 3, at 687-89.
330. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520.
331. I.R.C. §§ 2001 & 2010. This amount is based upon the value of an estate which
corresponds to the amount of the unified tax credit allowed. Thus, the size of the nontaxable
estate is subject to reduction by the amount of any taxable gifts made by the decedent during
his lifetime.
332. See note 331 supra.
333. FLA. STAT. § 735.103 (1977).
334. 1974 Fla. Laws, ch. 74-106, § 1 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 735.103 (1977)).
335. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-174, § 1.
336. FLA. STAT. § 735.107 (1977).
337. Id. § 735.201-.209.
338. Id. § 335.201.
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commentators harshly criticized the summary administration pro-
cedures enacted in the 1974 FPC. The criticisms were based upon
the omission of many provisions found in the 1973 probate laws,339
and its internal inconsistencies. 40 In 1975, the legislature corrected
most of these deficiencies.3 ' Thus, provisions were added to require
the petition for summary administration to include a proposed
schedule of distribution of all assets of the beneficiaries,342 to provide
that property of the decedent that remains in the hands of the
assignee under the order of the probate court continues to be liable
to satisfy claims against the decedent until the limitation period
expires,3 and to provide that the petitioners for summary adminis-
tration remain personally liable for lawful claims against the es-
tate.' These provisions afford the creditors of summarily adminis-
tered estates the same protection that is afforded to the creditors in
cases of family administration.
3 3
The 1975 legislature also added a provision to protect heirs and
devisees omitted from the summary administration process.3 ,
Under section 735.206(g):
Any heir or devisee of the decedent who was lawfully entitled to
share in the estate but who was not included in the order of
summary administration and distribution may enforce his rights
in appropriate proceedings against those who procured the order
and, when successful, shall be awarded reasonable attorney's fees
as an element of costs.347
There is no time limit prescribed for such an action. The omission
of such a provision from the 1974 FPC had been criticized by the
early commentators.4
The legislature followed another recommendation of the early
commentators by abolishing the procedure under which creditors
could be barred prior to the three-year statute of limitations.3 14 The
optional procedure seemed unnecessary due to the infrequency of
339. FLA. STAT. §§ 735.01-.15 (1973)(repealed 1974).
340. Fenn & Koren, supra note 3, at 689-91.
341. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, §§ 111-12.
342. FLA. STAT. § 735.203(2)(d) (1977).
343. Id. § 735.206(d).
344. Id. § 735.206(e).
345. See id. §§ 735.107(3)(d)-(f).
346. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, § 108.
347. FLA. STAT. § 735.206(g) (1977).
348. For a discussion of the ambiguities and problems encountered by omitted heirs
under the 1974 FPC, see Fenn & Koren, supra note 3, at 690 n.974.
349. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-220, § 110 (repealing FLA. STAT. §§ 735.207-.208 (Supp.
1974)); see Fenn & Koren, supra note 3, at 690.
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such creditors and the availability of provisions to bar such claims
under regular administration and subsequently proceed with sum-
mary administration. 5 °
Under the current FPC, unlike the 1974 FPC, family and sum-
mary administration are concise and effective methods for adminis-
tering small estates.35" ' These procedures will eliminate much of the
unnecessary cost attendant upon regular administration and will
provide speedy distribution to the heirs and beneficiaries.
VII. CONCLUSION
The current version of the FPC has eliminated many of the
difficulties encountered in the 1974 FPC. Most of the significant
changes occurred in 1975, prior to the effective date of the FPC. The
legislature, however, continued to modify and improve the FPC in
1976 and 1977. Unfortunately, as this article has illustrated, omis-
sions and inconsistencies still plague the FPC and additional revi-
sions are necessary if it is to become a concise and effective tool. As
the early commentators noted," 2 the piecemeal adoption of the UPC
has contributed to the confusion, and the legislature should reconsi-
der its previous rejection of UPC provision.
350. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-87, § 47.
351. Chapter 735 also permits disposition of personal property without administration
in certain cases. FLA. STAT. §§ 735.301-.302 (1977). Since there have been no significant
changes in either provision since the enactment of the 1974 FPC, discussion of this procedure
has been omitted from this article,
352. Fenn & Koren, supra note 3, passim.
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